Project Eleven Warns Quantum Computing Could Break Bitcoin Cryptography By 2030

A Project Eleven report warns that the digital asset industry holds over $3 trillion in aggregate value that is “virtually all of it is secured by the same class of cryptographic primitive: elliptic curve digital signatures,” which the report says are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks within four to seven years.

“It might be too late for bitcoin’s quantum migration, Project Eleven report argues Quantum computing does not only pose a risk to up to $3 trillion in digital assets, it also threatens the security of banking systems, military communications, digital identities and more, Project Eleven’s report warns”

@coindesk

The report frames the moment quantum computers can break widely used public-key cryptography as “Q-Day,” saying it could arrive as early as 2030 and no later than 2033, and adds that “The window for the world to migrate to post-quantum cryptography is narrowing.”

@coindesk

Project Eleven says sufficiently powerful quantum computers could use Shor’s algorithm to derive private keys from public keys, allowing attackers to forge signatures and take over control of wallets and digital accounts secured by elliptic curve cryptography.

CoinCentral reports Project Eleven CEO Alex Pruden urged Bitcoin developers to move from research to production on quantum-resistant signatures, warning that waiting increases exposure to quantum attacks on elliptic-curve cryptography.

CoinCentral also quotes Pruden saying, “Let’s focus on the D of R&D,” and pressed for production code as the migration challenge exceeds Taproot’s scope and timeline.

Project Eleven estimates that about 6.9 million Bitcoin sit in addresses with exposed public keys, and Crypto Briefing adds that this is roughly $560 billion worth of Bitcoin sitting in addresses with exposed public keys.

Crypto Briefing says the 6.9 million BTC figure comes from older address formats that expose public keys directly on the blockchain, while newer address types starting with “bc1” hash the public key before recording it on-chain.

CoinCentral

Crypto Briefing also states Project Eleven’s report estimates a greater than 50% likelihood that quantum computers will be capable of breaking these protections by 2033, and it contrasts that with Bitcoin’s decentralized governance requiring broad consensus among miners, node operators, developers, and users.

CoinDesk reports Pruden warned that Bitcoin’s migration to post-quantum cryptography could prove even harder than Taproot because it would require coordinated action across users, exchanges, custodians and miners.

CoinDesk further says Pruden leaned toward “recycling” the 5.6 million to 6.9 million vulnerable BTC tokens, worth up to roughly $500 billion at current prices back into the bitcoin’s supply curve rather than allowing a quantum attacker to eventually sweep them.

Project Eleven’s report warns the quantum threat extends beyond blockchains, saying the same public-key cryptography security used by bitcoin, ether and stablecoins also underpins banking systems, cloud infrastructure, authentication networks and military communications.

“Project Eleven CEO Alex Pruden urgedBitcoin developersto move from research to production on quantum-resistant signatures”

CoinCentral

CoinDesk says the report emphasizes that this means blockchains, banking infrastructure, cloud systems, military comms and other digital identity systems are also vulnerable, not just bitcoin, ethereum, stablecoins, and other blockchains.

Bitget’s coverage adds that Project Eleven warns the rapid development of quantum computing technology could put digital assets at high risk of theft in the near future, and it says the report notes almost all cryptocurrencies today are secured with elliptic curve signature algorithms.

CoinDesk also quotes the report’s framing that “The gap is entirely coordination, urgency, and willingness to accept the costs of migration,” and it says large systems often take between five to more than 10 years to migrate.

CoinCentral reports Pruden referenced NIST standards for post-quantum schemes based on hash functions and lattices, and he cited BIP-360, which proposes a quantum-resistant Taproot output type, as part of the push toward deployment.