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Iran cuts internet; Starlink hit
Iran’s nationwide protests have been met with a communications blackout that has also targeted satellite connectivity, according to multiple reports describing a sharp disruption beginning on 18 Dey.
“from the evening of Thursday, 18 Dey, internet and telephone connectivity for about 85 million Iranian citizens was suddenly severed”
A West Asian report says that “from the evening of Thursday, 18 Dey, internet and telephone connectivity for about 85 million Iranian citizens was suddenly severed,” pushing the country into what it calls a “total news stalemate.”
The same report says the regime’s “special focus on disrupting satellite internet services” has been aimed at Starlink, described as “the last remaining link between people and the outside world.”
It adds that “experts have stated that the regime is trying to block this communications path as well by using mobile jammers and GPS signal interference,” and that NetBlocks has confirmed Iran has entered a phase of “complete offline.”
Another report says Starlink’s role has become central since “the evening of 18 Dey when Internet in Iran was completely cut off,” but that “Starlink receivers in Iran are now themselves targeted by electronic interference and signal spoofing operations.”
Reuters analysis, as quoted by Radio Farda, frames the crackdown as turning Starlink into “the center of a technological and geopolitical confrontation,” with capabilities including “satellite jammers and signal spoofing technology.”
Across the coverage, the common thread is that the disruption is not limited to terrestrial networks, with Starlink described as both a lifeline and a target as Iran’s information environment tightens.
How jamming and spoofing work
Technical reporting in the sources describes how Iran’s disruption campaign can degrade Starlink by interfering with positioning and by reducing the quality of the connection.
A West Asian explainer says that after a “widespread Internet and telecommunications outage on January 8,” networks “somewhat reopened in the following days, but with heavy restrictions and significant disruptions,” and that Starlink became the target of a “disruption” campaign that “severely degraded its usability.”
It states that “the first signs of this effort, coinciding with the same day as the Internet outage, appeared as disruptions to positioning systems,” and it cites GPSJAM data saying that on “January 8 there was a noticeable level of jamming and interference of positioning signals in Tehran and surrounding areas.”
The report explains that Starlink terminals “typically rely on positioning information to determine their geographic position so they can establish a more precise connection with the satellites,” and it quotes communications researchers saying “Starlink uses the terminal's location to orient its antennas toward the satellites.”
It also quotes Kaweh Salamatnia, a professor at Sorbonne University, saying “jamming on the positioning signals” is “one of the classic methods for disrupting Starlink,” while noting that Starlink added an update that can “bypass” positioning interference by estimating position using the satellites and “the triangulation method.”
The same explainer says the workaround has limits, because when a terminal cannot determine its position normally, the backup system must “keep scanning the sky to find a suitable satellite,” which can render users “less mobile.”
It further describes a more severe degradation, quoting France 24 Observers that the connection dropped in the form of “data packet loss” between “30 and 80 percent,” and it frames this as potentially “active disruption” that saturates the transmission channel with disruptive or spoofed signals.
Bypassing tactics and constraints
Alongside the disruption, the sources describe how users attempt to keep Starlink functional under jamming constraints, including advice about where terminals can work and what users may need to power them.
“Local jamming is localized, and at a city level like Tehran it can only occur within a limited area”
The explainer says that “Local jamming is localized, and at a city level like Tehran it can only occur within a limited area,” and it adds that it “cannot cover the entire city either, because airports and military and law enforcement centers would also be affected.”
It recommends that “The best course of action for Starlink users is to move out of the cities,” specifying “Deserts and barren areas or places among mountains” as “the most suitable.”
The report also provides practical power details, saying the “power needed for Starlink terminals can be supplied using a car battery and a transformer,” and it states that “The terminal requires a voltage between 10 and 57 volts DC.”
It further notes that “Near airports and military facilities, jamming cannot be carried out,” linking the advice to the limits of interference around sensitive sites.
The same technical account describes how Starlink’s positioning update can allow some “bypass” of positioning interference, but it warns that the backup mode requires the terminal to “keep scanning the sky to find a suitable satellite,” which can make users “less mobile.”
In parallel, another source emphasizes that Starlink use in Iran is criminalized and that authorities have clashed with people who have the device, while a BBC-hosted security segment lists precautions such as not directly accessing “Iranian domestic websites and apps” and using “a trustworthy VPN to mask your address.”
Free service, legal risk, and monitoring
Several sources tie the Starlink disruption story to SpaceX’s decision to make service free for users inside Iran, while also stressing that the Iranian government treats the technology as illegal.
A West Asian report says that “Reuters on Friday, 26 Dey, reported that SpaceX, the owner of Starlink, had made satellite Internet access free for Iranians early this week,” and it frames the move as drawing SpaceX “into the center of a new geopolitical crisis.”
It adds that the U.S. military and intelligence agencies are watching how SpaceX counters disruption, because they “rely on Starlink and its military version, Starshield,” and it says “China is also watching these developments.”
Another source, a BBC segment, says Starlink’s satellite internet service for people inside Iran “has become free,” and it explains that previously users needed both the receiver device and a subscription “at least equivalent to $50,” but now users can connect “without paying the subscription.”
The BBC segment estimates “there are at least 50,000 Starlink receiver devices in Iran,” while also saying it is “not known how many devices were active.”
It warns that “Using Starlink in Iran is criminalized,” and it says “in recent days there have been reports of Iranian authorities clashing with people who have this device.”
Meanwhile, a West Asian report about the transfer of devices says U.S. officials announced that the Trump administration “secretly sent thousands of Starlink devices to Iran,” and it states that “In Iran, possessing a Starlink device is illegal and can carry several years in prison.”
International stakes and future escalation
The sources portray the Starlink confrontation as escalating beyond Iran into a broader contest involving governments, militaries, and international institutions, with consequences for how communications sovereignty is enforced.
“submarine internet cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz, which carry 17% of global Internet traffic”
A West Asian piece says Iran warned that if “its vital facilities were targeted, it would retaliate by striking submarine internet cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz, which carry 17% of global Internet traffic,” linking the dispute to critical infrastructure and global connectivity.
It also frames Starlink as a challenge to state control, asking whether it is “a technical means designed to break the Internet monopoly and grant freedom of digital roaming” or “a geostrategic tool to intervene in conflicts and internal affairs of states.”
Another source describes how Iran responded to the January restrictions by activating electronic systems to jam satellite signals, quoting Amir Rashidi, digital rights director at MIAN, describing the scale as “unprecedented in 20 years of monitoring internet access,” and it says the jamming “disabling up to 80% of Starlink traffic.”
That same report says Tehran filed a formal complaint with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and it claims the ITU “ruled in its favor,” deeming operating the service without a license a “violation of its sovereignty.”
It adds that “authorities imposed penalties of up to ten years in prison for users of these devices,” and it says security authorities “invented fake Starlink apps as digital traps to capture protesters.”
The Al Arabiya Persian report extends the stakes by describing a U.S. role, saying U.S. officials announced that the Donald Trump administration “secretly sent thousands of Starlink devices to Iran,” and it states “about 6,000 satellite internet devices have been moved into Iran.”
