Putin and Xi's move: The struggle over Venezuela's oil resources is only just beginning, and Europe should take the Venezuela crisis seriously as a strategic warning.

January 2026 was a turning point in international geopolitics when Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro’s sudden capitulation to U.S. President Donald Trump at the start of January 2026 marked more than a bilateral standoff.

“Putin and Xi’s Move: Why the Struggle over Venezuela’s Oil Resources Is Only Just Beginning and Why Europe Should Take the Venezuela Crisis as a Strategic Warning January 2026 is a turning point in international geopolitics, and its reverberations extend far beyond the Caribbean”

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In an interview with Spanish journalist Ignacio Ramonet he signaled a dramatic course reversal, offering to let the United States make oil deals when, where, and how Washington wanted, expressing willingness to repay debts through commodity deliveries, and agreeing to negotiate anti-drug control agreements.

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This shift followed months of military and economic pressure under the “South Spear Operation,” during which roughly 15,000 U.S. troops were deployed to the Caribbean region, 35 suspected drug-trafficking vessels were attacked, and more than 115 people lost their lives.

For the first time, the U.S. struck Venezuelan mainland targets with drones and destroyed a port facility, several oil tankers were seized off Venezuelan coasts, and a $50 million bounty was placed on Maduro’s head.

Venezuela’s oil paradox and economic vulnerability shaped the crisis: the country holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, estimated at around 300 billion barrels, yet production fell from a peak daily output of 3.45 million barrels in December 1997 to only 1.14 million barrels in November 2025.

The decline of more than 67 percent is attributed in the article to decades of mismanagement, lack of investment in infrastructure, and the loss of skilled personnel at state oil company PDVSA, and Venezuela now even imports gasoline.

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Between 90 and 99 percent of export revenues come from the petroleum industry, making the country extremely vulnerable to price swings and external pressure, and systematically tightened U.S. sanctions since 2017 cost Venezuela an estimated $226 billion in lost oil revenues between January 2017 and December 2024.

Despite sanctions, the article notes Venezuela recorded roughly 8.5 percent economic growth in 2025 after 18 consecutive quarters of expansion.

Maduro’s ability to withstand American pressure depended heavily on support from China and Russia, which the article presents as evidence of growing geopolitical fragmentation.

“Putin and Xi’s Move: Why the Struggle over Venezuela’s Oil Resources Is Only Just Beginning and Why Europe Should Take the Venezuela Crisis as a Strategic Warning January 2026 is a turning point in international geopolitics, and its reverberations extend far beyond the Caribbean”

Xpert.Digital

China signed a strategic, unconditional partnership agreement with Venezuela in September 2023 and became the largest buyer of Venezuelan oil, with nearly 70 percent of Venezuela’s oil exports going to China in 2023; the China Development Bank extended a $5 billion credit to state oil firm PDVSA, Beijing lent roughly $60 billion to Venezuela over the past decade, and private Chinese firms such as China Concord Resources Corp. plan to invest more than $1 billion in developing Venezuelan oil fields.

Russia signed a strategic partnership agreement with Venezuela in October 2025 covering energy, mining, transport, and security cooperation, and in December 2025 Moscow pledged full support to Caracas; Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Venezuelan counterpart Yvan Gil agreed to coordinate actions internationally, especially at the United Nations, to guarantee state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, and even possible arms deliveries were discussed.

The article uses these ties to argue that alternative financing and trade structures allow sanctioned states to survive and that the crisis is a test case for bloc-based competition.

For Europe the Venezuela crisis is a strategic warning about passivity, limited leverage, and the fragility of energy and trade ties; the article argues Europe has largely remained a bystander while the U.S., China, and Russia pursued their interests.

European trade ties with Venezuela collapsed: between 2015 and 2025 Germany’s exports to Venezuela fell by roughly 92 percent and imports by about 93 percent, Germany exported only $124.15 million to Venezuela in 2024, and about 28 German companies operate in Venezuela employing roughly 4,000 people but their numbers are falling.

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The EU applied sectoral sanctions since November 2017 and imposed travel bans and asset freezes on thirty-six members of the Maduro regime, but European measures are presented as more limited than U.S. actions and Europe largely limited itself to diplomatic calls to reduce tensions; the planned EU–CELAC summit in November 2025 was canceled, signaling reluctance to confront Trump.

The article states that U.S. air attacks on vessels in international waters and the closure of Venezuelan airspace are unlawful under international law and that even if evidence of drug trafficking exists the attacks would amount to war crimes, yet Europe has been largely silent or responded only with general appeals.

Finally, despite dramatic military escalation the immediate impact on global oil markets was muted: at the start of January 2026 North Sea Brent crude for March delivery was $61.24 per barrel (up $0.39) and West Texas Intermediate for February delivery was $57.80 (up $0.38), partly because Venezuela’s daily production is around one million barrels—about thirteen times smaller than the U.S.—and Europe imports almost no oil from Venezuela, but the article warns this short-term calm does not remove longer-term strategic risks to Europe.