Full Analysis Summary
Child recruitment on social media
Open-source investigations show both the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have used highly visible child 'lion cub' figures on social media to recruit, arm and glorify minors.
Bellingcat and Radio Dabanga documented dozens of TikToks — some AI-generated or staged — featuring children in military-style settings.
Clips place children alongside senior figures and show them reciting pro-war poetry or brandishing weapons.
The reporting points to a pattern of staged publicity that blurs the line between voluntary appearance and recruitment, raising concerns about exploitation and possible violations of international law.
Coverage Differences
Narrative Framing
Dabanga Radio TV Online focuses on Bellingcat’s technical findings and RSF-linked footage, naming commanders and sanctions; allAfrica emphasizes the broad visibility (one video over seven million views), appearances with multiple senior figures, and the social-media dynamics such as ‘voting’ contests. Dabanga’s report quotes RSF denials; allAfrica reports SAF’s lack of response and a retired brigadier’s description of unlawful ‘recruitment through deception.’
RSF child footage analysis
The RSF-linked footage, as described in the sources, features a child nicknamed the RSF 'lion cub' shown with senior RSF figures and celebrated by fighters.
Dabanga reports footage of the child sitting on the shoulder of RSF commander Salih Al-Foti.
In the same report, Al-Foti praises the 'lion cub' while denying organized recruitment and saying minors sometimes appear voluntarily.
The article also notes that Abu Lulu was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury on Feb. 19 and that Al-Foti was previously named in a 2023 UN human-rights report.
RSF materials and spokesman statements denying child recruitment are reported alongside Bellingcat’s technical analysis of staged or manipulated clips.
Coverage Differences
Tone
Dabanga Radio TV Online presents named RSF figures, sanctions and UN-report links and quotes RSF denials; this gives a mix of investigative detail and reporting of official RSF statements. allAfrica focuses less on named RSF commander details in the snippet and more on the overall visibility and cross-appearance with senior figures from multiple sides.
SAF-linked child propaganda
Bellingcat identified a viral account depicting a younger "Shibli" in SAF uniform with an account bio that presents itself as official and more than 700,000 TikTok followers.
Dabanga described SAF-linked clips as staged, non-frontline videos in which the child recites poems that mock RSF leader Hemedti.
Some of those clips urge violence with lines such as "kill every traitor and coward" and deliver speeches affirming national unity.
allAfrica's reporting complements this by noting Facebook pages and smaller accounts that show children holding assault rifles and standing with destroyed equipment.
Coverage Differences
Unique Coverage
Dabanga provides specific details on the SAF-linked ‘Shibli’ account, follower numbers and explicit phrases used in the clips; allAfrica highlights the broader ecosystem (Facebook pages, footage with weapons and destroyed tanks) and the social-media contest dynamics. Dabanga reports Bellingcat’s technical identification; allAfrica reports the extent and formats of content across platforms.
Responses on child recruitment
Official responses and reported context differ across the pieces.
Dabanga records RSF denials and the RSF spokesman's claim that a human-rights unit called the allegations politically motivated.
AllAfrica reports that the SAF did not respond and quotes a retired SAF brigadier who stresses official enlistment starts at 18 and describes child recruitment as unlawful "recruitment through deception."
Both sources cite experts warning that public praise of armed children encourages more recruitment and deepens psychological harm to other youngsters.
Coverage Differences
Contradiction
Dabanga reports RSF spokesman denials that the RSF recruits children and frames some appearances as voluntary, whereas allAfrica conveys that the SAF did not respond and includes a retired brigadier’s claim that recruitment occurs through deception—showing divergence in which forces' denials or responses are recorded and which are characterized as non-responsive or culpable.
Multimedia recruitment overview
Taken together, the available reporting shows a contested, multimedia recruitment and propaganda environment in which both sides use children on TikTok and other platforms.
These uses are often staged or AI-manipulated, raising serious legal and child-protection implications.
The coverage is limited to open-source documentation and statements cited in the articles, and there is variation in emphasis between naming specific commanders and sanctions versus social-media reach and on-platform contest dynamics.
Gaps remain, including a lack of direct responses from SAF in these snippets and limited on-the-ground verification in the extracts provided.
Coverage Differences
Missed Information
Both sources rely on Bellingcat and Radio Dabanga investigations but the snippets show gaps: Dabanga emphasizes named RSF figures and sanctions while allAfrica emphasizes social-media reach and platform mechanics. Neither snippet provides independent, on-the-ground verification in these extracts or full SAF comment in the quoted material.