Iran’s nuclear program and regime change: Will the US back Israel?

Israel is at a complex strategic crossroads. On one hand, the Israeli military’s assessment is that Iran has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions or its efforts to rebuild its military capabilities. On the other, the American president continues to send mixed signals: threats, military pressure and a buildup of forces in the region alongside a willingness to explore an agreement and reach an understanding with Tehran. The ball is in Trump’s court.

His alone. The question is not only whether he will decide to attack Iran, but also what Israel will do if he decides against it. Iranian threats intensify Even as the U.S. president discusses the possibility of reaching an agreement with Iran, he is sending other signals, instructing Vice President JD Vance to walk away from negotiations with Iran: “We don’t need a deal with them.” That apparently came after he concluded that the Iranians had no intention of negotiating over their nuclear program.

Beneath the surface, Iranian threats against the United States are intensifying, extending beyond statements by senior officials in Tehran. U.S. refueling aircraft and helicopters were moved from RAF Mildenhall in Britain following reports of an Iranian threat. That followed the removal of U.S. bombers from RAF Fairford in September over concerns about terrorist activity. Meanwhile, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was moved from his Washington home to housing on a secure military base following threats against his life attributed to Iran.

The disconnect between diplomatic contacts and developments on the ground raises a central question: Is Trump genuinely pursuing an agreement with Tehran, or are the negotiations also part of a pressure campaign and preparations for another military operation? This could be a deception effort, making U.S. military preparations and threats from Tehran factors that must be taken into account. Trump may be seeking to improve his bargaining position, or he may be keeping the military option open until the last moment.

The Israeli military would prefer to launch another campaign against Iran alongside the United States, but with broad consensus and not under a caretaker government. It maintains that there is no urgency to act now. This is more than an operational preference. It is also part of the understandings between Jerusalem and Washington that we have previously reported. Cooperation between the two militaries, intelligence coordination and the ability to concentrate their efforts in a joint military operation give Israel a significant advantage.

But the most important question is now coming into sharper focus: What happens if Donald Trump decides not to attack? Any disagreement between the political and military leadership makes the decision even more complicated. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to take a hard line on Iran, while the military must assess both its ability to strike and the timing. From Israel’s perspective, an agreement that does not comprehensively address Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities and ability to rebuild could prove to be only a temporary reprieve.

But the decision on whether to launch a campaign does not rest solely with Jerusalem. Trump is now the central figure who will determine whether a U.S. strike takes place, on what scale and when. Preparing for every scenario Israel understands that a limited campaign that ends without significantly damaging Iranian capabilities could merely postpone the next confrontation. Trump, by contrast, may settle for a limited military achievement or an agreement he can present as a success.

The Israeli military is preparing accordingly. It is ready both defensively and offensively, but military capability does not necessarily translate into a political decision to act. The question is whether Israel would be prepared to undertake a major operation without the United States, particularly if Washington opposed it. This is not a theoretical question. Israeli action without full American backing would carry diplomatic, military and economic consequences.

It could damage relations with the administration, complicate efforts to secure aid and international support and, above all, leave Israel facing the Iranian response and the possibility of a wider campaign alone. Both the military and the political leadership clearly favor joint action. Jerusalem will therefore need to distinguish between Trump declining to participate in a strike and actively opposing an Israeli operation. These are two entirely different scenarios.

In the first, Israel would need to assess its freedom to act and the cost of acting independently. In the second, the decision would be far more complicated. But another question receives far too little attention: What happens the day after? Israel cannot focus solely on whether to strike. It needs to know what strategic outcome it seeks to achieve. Striking the nuclear program and missile industry is justified and important to degrading Iran’s capabilities, but beyond that, the prevailing view in Israel is that only toppling the regime would deliver the required outcome.

The current situation requires Israel’s political leadership to hold clear-eyed discussions with the U.S. administration. Ultimately, Israel prefers to act alongside the United States rather than in its place. But that preference must not become a dependency that deprives Israel of the ability to make decisions about its national security. Addressing the nuclear and missile threats and, of course, toppling the regime are paramount interests.

If the United States does not join in, there is serious doubt that achieving those goals will be possible after Trump leaves office.