Netanyahu-Eisenkot unity government? The unlikely deal that could break Israel's deadlock

Israel's 1984 election campaign was bitter and deeply divisive. Hatred hung in the air between the rival political camps, against a backdrop of continued bloodshed in Lebanon and runaway inflation. Shimon Peres had little respect for Yitzhak Shamir, who looked down on him with even greater contempt. The rivalry between them was so intense that neither could have imagined, even in his worst nightmares, that when the campaign ended, they would find themselves serving in the same government for six full years. Yet that is precisely what happened. The politics of 1984 were certainly not those of 2026. Nevertheless, there are some striking parallels. When opposition leaders are asked about the possibility of cooperating with Benjamin Netanyahu and his Likud party after the October 27 election, the reaction ranges from loud laughter to an almost physical discomfort. None of them sees such a scenario becoming reality. But most opposition leaders have ruled out cooperation with Israel's Arab parties, adopting a political atmosphere that Netanyahu himself created and into which the opposition has allowed itself to be drawn. With polls suggesting a possible deadlock between the rival blocs, and both sides rejecting cooperation with Mansour Abbas, leader of the Arab Ra'am party, and the Joint List alliance of Arab parties, they may ultimately have no choice. The reason is simple: Another election would not guarantee victory. It might even leave one of the blocs in a worse position. The main reason such a scenario is conceivable is the absence of personal hostility between the two leading figures. Netanyahu does not despise Gadi Eisenkot, the former IDF chief of staff and leading opposition candidate. Quite the opposite. Eisenkot does not hate Netanyahu, or anyone else for that matter. The absence of personal bad blood could provide a starting point for negotiations. Both sides would have to make substantial concessions and painful compromises, with themselves and with their voters, before such an arrangement could take shape. But Israel has been here before. Eisenkot would have to agree to Netanyahu serving first as prime minister in a rotation arrangement. Simply entering such a government would be an enormous concession. Everyone remembers the precedent of Benny Gantz, whose decision to join Netanyahu in a unity government in 2020 effectively sounded the death knell for his political future. That is why Eisenkot would need to bring his voters more than a single achievement. Netanyahu will have to pay, and in cash Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, if he wants the first turn as prime minister, will have to pay a price. And he will have to pay in cash. Netanyahu has always preferred paying on credit, or on generous deferred-payment terms, and then, if possible, avoiding payment altogether. This time, he would have no choice. The parties led by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, two of the most prominent symbols of the current government, would have to find themselves on the opposition benches. Beyond that, no legislation involving the country's system of government or judiciary would advance without Eisenkot's consent, which, of course, he would not give to the current government's controversial proposals. An independent commission would also have to be established immediately to investigate the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre and the failures surrounding it. It would be modeled on the Winograd Commission, which investigated Israel's conduct during the 2006 Lebanon War. If Eisenkot could tell his voters, "Thanks to me, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are out. I will be defense minister and restore order in the West Bank. The judicial overhaul has been stopped, and an independent, nonpolitical commission will investigate October 7," those would be no small achievements. They would not be empty words. Netanyahu, for his part, could tell his voters: "We came within a hair's breadth of losing power. We held on for three years, and even after this election, I remain in charge. The government will not advance diplomatic initiatives, and our political approach has prevailed. You know that even if others hold certain ministerial portfolios, I am the experienced one, and I will be the one leading." But Netanyahu could give up his right-wing partners only if he decided, privately and with the agreement of his two advisers at home, that he would not run for prime minister again. He would make clear that he was receiving another term as prime minister and, in exchange, signal his retirement from political life after two years, with an eye toward running for president. President Isaac Herzog's term is due to end shortly before the proposed rotation that would hand the premiership to Eisenkot. The incentive for Netanyahu's family would be obvious. No more than a hint would be necessary. Would voters on both sides eagerly swallow this new political concoction? Certainly not. But if the alternative is worse, it might be the lesser evil. Anyone who doubts that such an arrangement is possible should consult the architects of the 1984 unity government. Quite a few of them are still with us.