Operation al-Khalil exposes limits of Israeli aggression

TEHRAN – The resistance operation in al-Khalil (Hebron), which took place just days before the Israeli elections, was far more than an isolated security incident. It raises fundamental questions about the limits of power within the Israeli regime’s security establishment and its ability to prevent armed resistance operations in the occupied West Bank. Despite continued raids, tighter military restrictions, an expanding campaign of searches, arrests, detentions, and home demolitions, armed resistance remains ongoing. This exposes the gap between the ability to establish control on the ground and the ability to achieve lasting security. The operation is significant because of its timing and the context in which it occurred. Raids by Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) alongside settler terrorism on Palestinians, their land, and their property in the West Bank have been escalating, alongside threats to expand the aggression. The question is not only what security consequences the resistance operation has produced, but what it reveals about the shortcomings of the regime’s approach in the West Bank. The IOF continues to pursue policies aimed at imposing new realities through aggression and the complete control daily life in the occupied territories. The armed resistance operation in al-Khalil that killed and injured IOF troops cannot be understood separately from the conditions in the city and its surrounding areas, where IOF attacks on Palestinians continue and overlap with settler terrorism. On September 24, homes and other structures were demolished in the area of Jinba near al-Khalil, displacing eight families comprising 55 Palestinians, including 32 children. Some were forced to seek shelter in caves. On October 12 and 13, children and their vehicles were attacked with rocks and sticks as they made their way to school. On October 17, settlers attacked the village of Ma’in near al-Khalil, injuring three Palestinians, one of whom was shot with live ammunition. They also stole 380 sheep. On October 19, farmers were attacked while harvesting olives. These incidents are also inseparable from the IOF restrictions imposed on Palestinians at the Ibrahimi Mosque in al-Khalil and the continued measures enforcing its division by time and space. Palestinians face conditions in which Israel’s pressure extends beyond military operations into the details of everyday life and their ability to remain on their land, amid the ongoing threat of ethnic cleansing. The al-Khalil operation raises questions about the occupation regime’s ability to prevent armed resistance, even under heightened alert and strict security measures. Military superiority, a heavy military occupation, and the capacity to carry out raids and arrests do not necessarily mean an ability to anticipate every operation or prevent it from taking place. This is where the central contradiction emerges. The IOF can expand its raids and impose sweeping restrictions on Palestinians in the West Bank, but it cannot automatically turn this into lasting, guaranteed security. Controlling territory is not the same as being able to control every security or political development that occurs within it. The fact that an armed resistance operation took place in al-Khalil at this particular moment exposes the IOF’s security failure to anticipate the operation, issue an early warning, and prevent it from happening. It also puts claims of comprehensive security control to a serious test and serves as a reminder that the regime’s security policy in the West Bank, however extensive, prolonged, or intensified, cannot eliminate the underlying factors sustaining the aggression against Palestinians. This becomes even more significant given the Netanyahu government’s reliance on military force as its primary tool for establishing deterrence and reshaping the situation in the West Bank. As arrests and terror expand, the possibility of renewed confrontation remains strong. This is a natural consequence of any occupation. The al-Khalil operation comes at a sensitive electoral moment for the Netanyahu coalition, which seeks to present its strategy of maintaining security control over the West Bank as proof of the success of its policies. An armed resistance operation occurring amid this rhetoric and strategy raises questions within the regime itself about the effectiveness of the approach and the Netanyahu government’s ability to deliver on its security promises. Remarks by Netanyahu and Katz, about a large-scale offensive in the West Bank have been translated into expanded raids, sieges, mass arrests, demolition of homes and infrastructure, similar to the patterns seen in refugee camps across the northern West Bank. The rhetoric is reminiscent of similar aggression used during the Second Intifada in 2002 under Ariel Sharon. The regime’s continued reliance on military force raises a fundamental question about the limits of this approach, which has failed to deliver security. Establishing security control does not guarantee safety or eliminate the causes of the conflict with the Palestinian people. Nor can expanding the aggression guarantee complete security as long as the occupation, its policies, and its violations of Palestinian rights remain. The regime refuses to acknowledge these underlying factors and openly declares its intention to settle the conflict by force, presenting this outcome as inevitable. Looking back, the occupation regime’s past experiences with the use of excessive force have failed to deliver the strategic outcomes. In other words, force cannot settle a struggle over land. The strategic significance of the al-Khalil operation lies not simply in its immediate security impact, but also in what it reveals about the difficulty of turning IOF superiority into a definitive resolution amid the West Bank aggression. The regime possesses overwhelming military power and an extensive, integrated security and military apparatus. It can impose realities on the ground and carry out its plans against Palestinians, but it cannot guarantee lasting security and stability. From this perspective, many believe that the return of armed resistance operations amid the choices of occupation, settlement expansion, and ongoing aggression against Palestinians reinforces a crucial point: the issue goes beyond an isolated intelligence failure. The more pressure Palestinians face, the more likely such operations are to recur as a consequence of IOF policies and settler terrorism. Armed resistance operations do not emerge in a vacuum. They arise in response to the occupation regime’s policies imposed on a people whose entire existence is under threat, even on their own land. Palestinian land is being seized and subjected to Judaization, while Palestinians face growing threats to their rights, presence, future, land, and holy sites. With a large-scale IOF assault and forced displacement underway in al-Khalil, the West Bank faces the possibility of an escalation that could spiral out of control. The regime’s real dilemma is not simply how to tighten its control over the West Bank, but its belief that control through force can bring the resistance to an end. Every military operation carried out by the IOF may alter certain realities on the ground, but it cannot erase Palestinians’ rights to their land or their other rights, nor can it extinguish their aspirations for freedom. The regime’s military superiority does not, by any means, guarantee that the armed struggle can be brought to a definitive end as long as its political roots remain unresolved and resistance can rise again from the ashes.