Israel could leave Syria but needs buffer zones in Gaza and Lebanon, ex-national security chief says
Retired Maj. Gen. Giora Eiland, former head of Israel's National Security Council, spoke Tuesday at the People of the State conference, the flagship event hosted by ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth. Eiland discussed what he described as Israel's fundamental mistake in 2007 that ultimately led to the October 7 massacre, as well as the differences between Israel's buffer zones in Gaza and Lebanon and the territory it holds in Syria.
"The great mistake always begins with an incorrect description of reality," Eiland said, referring to the Gaza Strip. "From 2007, through October 7 and to this day, the State of Israel has continued to make the mistake of mischaracterizing the reality in Gaza. The description is that there are two million unfortunate people there, and one day a terrible terrorist organization called Hamas came along, forcibly took over the Strip, and therefore it is right for us to fight Hamas, but we have nothing against the two million unfortunate people who found themselves in this situation."
"This naive description has nothing to do with reality," he continued. "In 2007, Gaza became a state in every sense, with clearly defined borders, an effective central government capable of collecting taxes, managing all the health care, education and sanitation systems, and so on. It has a completely independent foreign policy and its own army. The correct way to define what happened on October 7 is that the State of Gaza launched a war against the State of Israel."
Eiland argued that this flawed understanding of reality also shaped the IDF's assessment of Hamas. "For years, it was known that on the other side of the border there was a Nukhba force of at least 3,000 men, well-equipped and well-trained, with extremely high religious motivation, and just 10 minutes away from reaching any Israeli community or IDF base. Their clear and defined mission was to raid the State of Israel."
"In all IDF situation assessments over the years, from the division and command levels to the General Staff, when they discussed what might happen, they defined the worst-case scenario as a simultaneous attack by 60 terrorists. Wait a minute, you know they have 3,000, and you're saying the worst case is 60? How did such a huge gap emerge?"
"The answer is very simple. It is entirely philosophical," Eiland explained, arguing that the military's assessment was shaped by its definition of Hamas as a terrorist organization conducting guerrilla warfare through individual terrorists.
The sin of belief
According to Eiland, the same mistake was evident along Israel's northern border on October 7. "In 2014, Hezbollah established the Radwan Force, numbering 6,000 terrorists. Gradually, they moved closer to the border, building bunkers and infrastructure. The formal mission of the 91st Division is to defend the Galilee, but it did not prepare for defense."
"To do that, you need to implement the principles of defense: depth and reserves. What did the Galilee Division actually have at 6:30 a.m. on October 7? A thin line of outposts, no depth, no second line, no reserves and, most importantly, no available firepower capable of effectively delivering a large volume of fire against points of infiltration."
Eiland argued that the series of failures was not the result of a mistaken strategic conception, but something more fundamental.
"You first adopt a belief about what will happen and what will not happen, and from that moment you arrange the facts to fit that belief," he said. "Your brain is flexible enough to adapt reality to the belief instead of the other way around."
"That is worse than a mistaken conception, because a conception at least supposedly reflects a flawed thought process, but still a thought process. I'm talking about belief. Belief that has no rational basis, whose entire foundation is emotional and is built on many false assumptions that I developed over the years and never even examine."
Despite his criticism, Eiland identified two areas in which he believes the IDF has improved over the past three years. The first is basic military discipline, which he described as "appalling on October 7."
"The army has learned, and I think the improvement is real," he said.
The second improvement, he argued, is the recognition that Israel needs buffer zones along its borders. "In both Lebanon and Gaza, Israel cannot defend itself when there are communities along the border and, on the other side, an enemy 200 meters away with offensive intentions," he said.
However, Eiland argued that the situation along the Syrian border is significantly different. "There are many operational and tactical differences, and the need to hold territory in Syria is lower than in Lebanon," he explained.
He stressed that he was not proposing a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the territory. "Israel can return to the border line provided there is an American plan guaranteeing that advanced weapons manufactured in Turkey or Russia will not enter Syria," he said.
"We can give up that particular enclave inside Syria. It is a risk worth taking, provided the strategic benefit we receive in return is far more important."