Legal status of Lebanese Hezbollah resistance movement under international law

The legal status of paramilitary organizations varies across domestic legal systems. This commentary seeks to examine the legitimacy and lawfulness of resistance movements, focusing on the Lebanese Hezbollah resistance movement’s status within the Arab country’s legal and political order. To that end, it is necessary to begin with a brief overview of the resistance movement's origins and institutional character. The emergence of Hezbollah was the culmination of several intersecting historical developments. These included the longstanding socioeconomic marginalization of Lebanon's Shia population, concentrated in the impoverished region of Jabal Amel, stretching from the Israeli border to the Litani River; Israel's occupation of the Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shuba hills following the 1967 Six-Day War; the repercussions of the military activities conducted from southern Lebanon by members of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah) beginning in 1970; the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975; Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in 1978 (the Litani Operation); and the subsequent deployment of Syrian military forces in Lebanon. These developments prompted Lebanese Shia leader Imam Musa al-Sadr to establish the military wing of Harakat al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the Dispossessed). This armed organization was later renamed Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya (the Lebanese Resistance Regiments), better known by its Arabic acronym, Amal . Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon (“Operation Peace for Galilee”) subsequently facilitated the formation of a coalition comprising the Islamic Amal Movement under the leadership of Sayyid Hussein al-Musawi, a splinter faction of Amal, the Iraqi Hizb al-Da'wah , guided by Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, as well as other groups, including the Association of the Ulama of the Beqaa, the Islamic Committees, Islamic Jihad, and certain members of Fatah affiliated with the Abu Jihad faction. All these developments laid the foundations for the emergence of an organization that formally announced its establishment under the name Hezbollah in 1984. Since its inception, Hezbollah has operated through integrated legal, political, and military structures. Although it has never formally constituted itself as a registered political party under Lebanese law, it has consistently participated in elections to the Lebanese Parliament through the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc electoral list. For several decades, Hezbollah has enjoyed both explicit and implicit recognition and support from successive Lebanese governments. Over this period, successive ministerial statements have consistently affirmed the legitimacy of resistance in various formulations, referring, inter alia, to the "right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation," the "legitimate right of the Lebanese people to resist" (Omar Karami Government, 1991), resistance as a "national and political duty" (Rafik Hariri Government, 1995), the "necessity of liberating southern Lebanon through the courageous resistance" (Salim al-Hoss Government, 1998–2000), and once again the "right of Lebanese citizens to resist the Israeli occupation" (Tammam Salam Government, 2014–2016). Beyond these ministerial declarations, the 1969 Cairo Agreement between Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) authorized Palestinians residing in Lebanon to conduct military and guerrilla operations, provided that such activities respected Lebanon's sovereignty and national security. A different legal framework, however, emerged with the 1989 Taif Agreement, which brought an end to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). The agreement called for the disbandment of all militias and the transfer of their weapons to the Lebanese State. Consistent with this approach, the Siniora government in 2006 endorsed the principle that national defense should remain the exclusive responsibility of the State. Both the Taif Agreement and the Siniora government's position were subsequently reflected in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), which called for the disarmament of all armed groups operating within Lebanon. The armed conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel in 2024, which followed Israel's military operations in Gaza, and in 2026, which were triggered by the joint US–Israeli aggression against Iran, unfolded during the presidency and premiership of two political leaders who were not aligned with Hezbollah, namely President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Both the 2024 Israel–Lebanon agreement and the 2026 tripartite framework agreement between Lebanon, Israel, and the United States placed particular emphasis on the disarmament of non-state armed groups and the establishment of the Lebanese State's exclusive authority over the possession of arms. The framework agreement, in particular, contains provisions affirming the "disarmament of non-state armed groups and the dismantling of their infrastructure"; the "exclusive control of weapons by the Lebanese State"; the "verification and certification of the successful disarmament of non-state armed groups"; the "disarmament of all armed groups operating outside State authority"; the "disarmament and dismantling of such groups throughout Lebanese territory"; and the requirement that "these groups shall have no military or security role, nor retain any armed capability, anywhere in Lebanon." Setting aside the political, military, security-related, or ideological arguments advanced for Hezbollah's continued existence, this commentary seeks to address a narrower legal question. Its purpose is to examine, from the standpoint of international law, whether Hezbollah's possession of arms may be regarded as legally legitimate. 1. The right of self-determination of peoples under foreign military occupation Under international law, peoples living under trusteeship, foreign occupation, colonial rule, or racist regimes are entitled to the right of external self-determination , namely, the right to free their territory from such forms of alien domination. This principle has been repeatedly affirmed by the United Nations General Assembly, which has recognized the legitimacy of "struggles" against alien subjugation (Resolution 2625), alien domination (Resolutions 2649 and 3103), foreign occupation (Resolution 2786), and foreign domination and alien subjugation (Resolutions 2787 and 3070). Similarly, Article 1(4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, by extending the law of international armed conflict to wars fought against alien occupation , implicitly recognizes the legitimacy of such struggles. International legal instruments consistently vest the right of external self-determination in peoples rather than states. It follows that where a territory is subject to foreign occupation, the people inhabiting that territory are entitled to resist the occupying power in pursuit of the restoration of their territorial integrity and self-determination. According to the present analysis, Israel has occupied the Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shuba hills since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and, following the 2026 conflict, has occupied at least six percent of Lebanese territory. On this basis, the continuing occupation of parts of Lebanon provides the legal foundation for the inhabitants of those territories to engage in resistance against the occupying power. 2. The obligation to support the right of self-determination of peoples under foreign occupation Even assuming the termination of the current occupation of Lebanese territory, the legal legitimacy of Hezbollah may, according to this analysis, still be defended on the basis of its support for the Palestinian people's struggle against occupation. Under international law, the United Nations and all states are under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful situation arising from Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories, to ensure Israel's compliance with international humanitarian law, and to employ lawful means to bring to an end serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law ( jus cogens ), including the right of self-determination and the prohibition of aggression. These obligations are reflected, inter alia, in paragraph 4 of operative clause of the International Court of Justice's 2004 Advisory Opinion, paragraphs 7–9 of operative clause of its 2024 Advisory Opinion, and Article 41 of the International Law Commission's 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA). Accordingly, both the United Nations and the Lebanese State are under an obligation to respect and ensure the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to support its realization through the termination of foreign occupation. In this context, the present analysis contends that, should the Lebanese government fail to discharge this obligation, disarmament of Hezbollah for the purpose of contributing to that objective would be inconsistent with the duty to ensure respect for, and support the realization of, the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. 3. The invalidity of international organizations' decisions contrary to the right of self-determination of peoples under occupation Although United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), and 1701 (2006) call for the disarmament of Lebanese paramilitary forces, the implementation of these resolutions is subject to two fundamental legal impediments. First, the preambular sections of these resolutions emphasize the necessity of ending Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory. However, approximately six percent of Lebanon's territory remains under Israeli occupation, rendering the conditions necessary for the implementation of the remaining provisions of these resolutions unfulfilled. Second, the right of peoples to self-determination, including the right to resist foreign occupation, constitutes a jus cogens norm of international law. Consequently, any resolution or decision that is incompatible with this peremptory norm lacks legal validity. This principle is expressly reflected in Article 16 of the 2022 Draft Conclusions on Identification and Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms of General International Law ( Jus Cogens ) , adopted by the International Law Commission. 4. The invalidity of state decisions contrary to the right of self-determination of peoples under occupation The right of peoples to self-determination in the face of foreign military occupation, including the right to engage in national resistance, is a fundamental human right that has attained the status of a jus cogens norm of international law. Accordingly, any decision or measure adopted by a State that recognizes, endorses, or contributes to the maintenance of such an unlawful situation is without legal effect (Article 15 of the 2022 Draft Conclusions on Identification and Legal Consequences of Peremptory Norms of General International Law ( Jus Cogens ) ). The Framework Agreement provides only for Israel's withdrawal from the designated Pilot Zones and does not extend to the so-called Security Zone , or Yellow Line , located approximately 5 to 10 kilometers from the Israel–Lebanon border (the Blue Line ), which remains under Israeli occupation. Consequently, any demand for the disarmament of Hezbollah while the Israeli occupation continues cannot be regarded as consistent with the international legal framework governing the right of self-determination under foreign occupation. 5. ‘Sovereignty in abeyance’ in the context of foreign military aggression The decision of the Lebanese Government to disarm Hezbollah in the context of continuing foreign military aggression or occupation raises serious concerns under both constitutional and international law. The concept of sovereignty in abeyance , as well as the related notion of the failed State , reflects the proposition that a central function of sovereignty is the effective protection of a State’s population and the preservation of its internal and external security. Where a State is unable to discharge these essential functions, the practical exercise of certain sovereign responsibilities may, under exceptional circumstances, be assumed by alternative actors. The doctrines of the social contract and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) recognize that the primary obligation to ensure the security and protection of the population rests with the State. Nevertheless, the State’s failure to fulfill this obligation does not, in itself, eliminate the possibility of protective action by other actors where fundamental rights are threatened, particularly in situations involving grave breaches of international law. In such circumstances, a person or group of persons may exercise a governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities (Article 9 of ARSIWA) . Accordingly, Hezbollah, as an organization possessing a substantial social and political base within Lebanese people, may be argued to possess a more immediate claim to legitimacy, in comparison with external actors based on R2P, to undertake protective measures against serious international violations, including foreign military aggression. 6. The inherent right of self-defense of legal persons and non-state actors The right of self-defense may be understood as an inherent right attached not only to natural persons and States but also, under certain circumstances, to legal persons and organized entities possessing a distinct legal and operational identity . Just as certain non-State actors may assume obligations under international law, most notably the obligation to respect the rules of international humanitarian law, they may also be recognized as holders of certain corresponding rights, including the right to defend their existence, organizational integrity, and members against attacks. From this perspective,