The long road to peace runs through a wall of distrust

Goa, India – Washington wants a settlement on its terms, while Tehran refuses to negotiate under the shadow of military coercion. Between these irreconcilable positions lies the danger of another prolonged conflict in West Asia. The United States and Iran remain caught in a dangerous confrontation in which diplomacy continues, military threats persist and the prospect of a lasting settlement grows increasingly distant. Despite efforts by countries such as Qatar and Pakistan to bring the two sides closer to an understanding, the fundamental differences between Washington and Tehran remain unresolved.

There have been proposals, negotiations and diplomatic exchanges, but none has managed to bridge the enormous political and strategic divide separating the two countries. The problem is not simply a disagreement over Iran's nuclear programme or the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. It is a much deeper confrontation over sovereignty, regional power, security and the future political order of West Asia. Each side believes that conceding ground would weaken its strategic position.

Consequently, negotiations have become an extension of the conflict rather than an instrument for ending it. President Donald Trump has approached Iran through a familiar doctrine of coercive diplomacy. His administration appears convinced that sustained military pressure, economic isolation and the threat of further escalation will eventually force Tehran to accept American demands. The underlying assumption is that Iran, confronted with the enormous military superiority of the United States, will have little choice but to yield.

But this calculation overlooks an important dimension of Iranian politics. Tehran does not view the confrontation merely as a contest of military strength. It sees it as a struggle over national sovereignty and the country's right to determine its own security arrangements. For the Iranian leadership, accepting American demands under military pressure would amount to political surrender, with consequences extending far beyond the negotiating table.

Two countries, two very different ideas of peace The American and Iranian positions reveal why a negotiated settlement remains so elusive. Washington wants Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions, accept stringent restrictions on its nuclear capabilities and submit to arrangements that would prevent any future attempt to develop a nuclear arsenal. It also wants the immediate and unconditional reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, an essential artery for international energy supplies and maritime commerce.

The Trump administration is equally anxious to avoid an extended military engagement that could draw American forces into another Middle Eastern war. Iran, however, is demanding a fundamentally different starting point. It wants economic sanctions and restrictions lifted before making major concessions. Tehran argues that it cannot be expected to negotiate meaningful compromises while facing military threats and economic strangulation.

It also wants recognition of its legitimate security interests in the Persian Gulf and a fundamental reconsideration of the American military presence and security architecture in the region. Iran's demands extend beyond its bilateral relationship with Washington. It wants an end to the wider regional conflicts, particularly those involving Gaza and Lebanon, and has raised the question of compensation for the destruction caused by the war.

These positions are difficult to reconcile. The United States wants concessions as a condition for easing pressure; Iran wants the pressure removed before it makes concessions. Both want guarantees, but neither trusts the other sufficiently to offer them. The collapse of earlier diplomatic initiatives, including the short-lived Islamabad understanding of June 2026, illustrates the fragility of the negotiating process. Pakistan and Qatar may facilitate communication, but mediation cannot succeed unless the principal parties are prepared to recognise that the other side has legitimate concerns that cannot simply be wished away.

The politics of coercion and resistance One of the greatest obstacles to peace is the belief in Washington that Iran can be brought to its knees through sustained pressure. This approach assumes that economic hardship and military setbacks will eventually compel Tehran to accept American conditions. Yet Iran has spent decades developing a political and military doctrine built around resistance to external pressure. Its leadership understands that it cannot match American military power conventionally.

It has therefore invested in asymmetric capabilities, regional alliances and strategic instruments that can impose costs on a vastly more powerful adversary. The Strait of Hormuz is central to this calculation. Through this narrow waterway passes a substantial proportion of the world's internationally traded oil. Any disruption has consequences far beyond the immediate region, affecting energy prices, shipping costs, international markets and the economies of countries that depend on imported fuel.

Iran's ability to threaten maritime security gives it leverage that cannot be measured simply by comparing military inventories. It knows that instability in the Persian Gulf carries a global economic cost and that Washington cannot indefinitely ignore the consequences for international energy markets. This does not mean Iran can defeat the United States militarily. It cannot. But it can make the cost of continuing the confrontation considerably higher than Washington may have anticipated.

Its strategy is not necessarily to win a conventional war but to deny the United States a quick and politically presentable victory. There is an equally important domestic political dimension. Any Iranian government seen as capitulating to American demands after a sustained military confrontation would face serious questions about its legitimacy and its ability to defend national sovereignty. Resistance has become an important part of the political identity of the Islamic Republic.

Compromise is possible, but it cannot easily be presented as submission. The trust deficit is perhaps the greatest obstacle No serious discussion of the current impasse can ignore the history of American-Iranian relations, particularly the 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear agreement negotiated during the Obama administration. Iran had accepted restrictions and international monitoring of its nuclear programme in return for sanctions relief.

The agreement was the product of years of difficult negotiations and was widely regarded as an important diplomatic achievement. Trump's decision to withdraw from the agreement in 2018, despite Iran's continued compliance with its principal nuclear commitments at that time, fundamentally damaged the credibility of American diplomacy in Tehran. For Iran, the lesson was unmistakable: an agreement negotiated with one American administration could be discarded by its successor.

No amount of diplomatic language could guarantee that Washington would honour its commitments beyond the political life of the president who signed them. This history explains why Iran is reluctant to accept another agreement based primarily on American assurances. It wants arrangements that cannot be easily reversed and guarantees that any future American administration will be constrained from returning to military confrontation or economic coercion.

The United States, on the other hand, wants verifiable and enforceable restrictions on Iran's nuclear programme. It is unwilling to offer extensive sanctions relief without first securing meaningful concessions. This is the diplomatic paradox. Washington demands guarantees from Tehran while Tehran demands guarantees from Washington. Neither is prepared to trust the other. Neither side can afford an endless war For all the rhetoric surrounding military strength and strategic victory, neither country has an easy path to a decisive outcome.

Iran cannot defeat the United States in a conventional military confrontation. American superiority in air power, naval capabilities, intelligence and advanced weaponry is overwhelming. But the United States, despite its military advantages, cannot assume that it can destroy Iran's capacity to resist or impose a political settlement through force alone. An extended conflict would carry enormous costs for Washington. It would threaten international energy supplies, destabilise regional allies, unsettle financial markets and potentially draw the United States into another prolonged Middle Eastern engagement.

Trump has repeatedly projected himself as a president who wants to end wars rather than inherit them. A drawn-out confrontation with Iran would seriously undermine that political claim. For Tehran, survival and the preservation of its strategic independence are paramount. It does not need to defeat the United States to claim that it has resisted American pressure. It needs to demonstrate that military superiority cannot automatically translate into political submission.

The danger, therefore, is that both sides may settle into a cycle of limited military strikes, retaliatory actions, threats and intermittent diplomatic initiatives. Such an arrangement may prevent an immediate full-scale war, but it is hardly peace. It leaves the region permanently vulnerable to miscalculation, with the possibility that one military incident could trigger a much wider confrontation. A different approach is necessary If Washington genuinely wants a lasting settlement, it will eventually have to move beyond the demand for total Iranian capitulation.

A durable agreement cannot be constructed on the assumption that one country must surrender its strategic interests while the other retains the freedom to dictate the terms. A more realistic framework would require reciprocal and phased commitments. Iran could agree to verifiable restrictions on its nuclear programme, including meaningful limits on enrichment and enhanced international monitoring. In return, the United States would need to provide tangible and progressive sanctions relief, rather than vague promises of future economic normalisation.

Equally vital are credible security guarantees to prevent any renewed military aggression. Iran must have reason to believe that compliance with an agreement will not simply leave it exposed to another round of American or Israeli strikes. The Strait of Hormuz must also be addressed through an international arrangement that safeguards freedom of navigation, protects commercial shipping and recognises the legitimate security concerns of the countries bordering the Persian Gulf.

It cannot become a permanent instrument of confrontation or be treated as though the security of the waterway belongs exclusively to Washington. Finally, the wider regional conflict cannot be separated from the future of American-Iranian relations. The continuing devastation in Gaza, instability in Lebanon and the broader contest for influence across West Asia are part of the same geopolitical landscape. A bilateral agreement that ignores these realities may provide a temporary respite but will not resolve the deeper causes of instability.

Peace cannot be imposed through military superiority The central question confronting Washington and Tehran is whether they are prepared to recognise the limits of coercion. Military superiority can destroy infrastructure, eliminate commanders and inflict enormous damage. It cannot, by itself, manufacture political legitimacy or guarantee the surrender of a nation's strategic ambitions. The United States must recognise that Iran cannot simply be ordered to accept a regional security arrangement designed and controlled by Washington.

Iran, for its part, must recognise that its actions in the Strait of Hormuz and its regional military posture carry consequences for countries far beyond its immediate adversaries. There is a difference between winning a military confrontation and securing a political settlement. The former may be achieved through overwhelming force; the latter requires compromise, guarantees and a recognition of mutual interests. The greatest danger at present is that both countries may mistake the other's inability to secure an outright victory for an opportunity to push harder.

That calculation could prolong the conflict and bring the region closer to a much wider war. Peace will remain elusive as long as Washington confuses submission with agreement and Tehran equates every compromise with surrender. The road to a settlement does not lie in another demonstration of military strength. It lies in the difficult recognition that neither country can secure lasting stability by denying the other a legitimate place in the regional order.

For West Asia, and indeed for the world, that recognition cannot come soon enough.