Who is behind Iran’s most influential opposition accounts?

TEHRAN - A former MEK member testifies that prominent social media accounts, protest groups and opposition channels are operated from the organization's headquarters in Albania, using concealed identities to portray their content as coming from inside Iran. Iranian opposition accounts on social media, particularly on Twitter, now known as X, have long been among the most active and influential accounts during periods of unrest in Iran.

These accounts circulate narratives about what they claim is happening inside the country, publish purported firsthand reports, announce alleged casualties, make claims of revelations and release videos that have not previously appeared online. Their content often receives extensive exposure, with posts attracting hundreds of thousands or even millions of likes and sometimes trending among the platform's most prominent topics. They can generate waves of online activity, amplify particular narratives and shape public perceptions of events in Iran.

At first glance, audiences may assume that the individuals behind these accounts are Iranian citizens operating from inside the country. However, revelations have occasionally exposed a reality markedly different from what their online profiles suggest. Previous reports have raised questions about the role of social media platforms, particularly American companies, in amplifying Iranian opposition accounts, as well as alleged cooperation between platform executives and US security and intelligence agencies.

Critics have also pointed to the removal of accounts supporting the Iranian government or opposing broader US policies. Allegations concerning the Pentagon's and Israel's involvement in social media operations have likewise been the subject of previous reports and disclosures. More recently, fresh revelations concerning several prominent accounts have shed further light on the alleged organization behind such activities. The People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO), is a longstanding armed opposition organization that was previously designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and European countries.

It now operates as an opposition group against the Iranian government. According to figures cited in reports, the organization has been responsible for the killing of more than 17,000 people in Iran. Alongside its assassinations of government officials and ordinary citizens, the MEK has a history of intelligence cooperation with the United States and Israel, with numerous examples cited in accounts of its activities. Former members reveal media operations in Albania Former members of the organization have recently revealed, for the first time, that media operations rooms exist at its Ashraf 3 compound in Albania, where extensive anti-Iranian content is produced in cooperation with American social media platforms and presented as material generated by individuals inside Iran.

The revelations emerged as proceedings are underway in Iran concerning allegations against the MEK leaders. During one of the hearings, a former member of the organization appeared as a witness and provided details about its media operations. The organization's media structure In his testimony, Mostafa Beheshti, referring to his brief period working in the organization's advertising and midday news department, identified Fahimeh Arvani as the department's principal official.

He said individuals including Asadollah Motanna, Ali Khodaei-Sefat and Saeed Khodaei-Sefat also worked under the department. Beheshti stressed that no independent decisions were made in Iraq, at Ashraf 3 or at other organizational headquarters. "Everything had to be coordinated with the overseas department," he said. According to Beheshti, officials in the organization's foreign department, including Mohammad Mohaddessin, (also known as the planner)- Behnam, Mohammad-Ali Towhidi, Shahin Ghobadi, Afshin Alavi and Shahzad Sadr, held weekly telephone conferences with the internal headquarters to determine what political, satirical or news content should be broadcast.

He said news lines and daily instructions were communicated in a precise and structured manner. "We would receive a ticket or an instruction saying, for example, that these particular stories had to be broadcast at 10 a.m. during the news bulletin," Beheshti said. "We had to find the images they wanted, including those specifically instructed by Brother Behnam, edit them and broadcast them." He added that the foreign department determined which stories would be aired, at what time, for how long and with which images.

In some cases, he said, instructions required content to be broadcast without images to avoid upsetting the host country, whether France or, during the organization's presence in Iraq, the government of the time. Referring to a video presented as evidence, Beheshti said the organization attempted to create the impression that its media content was being produced by young people inside Iran. However, the principal production facilities and operational centers behind the content were located outside Iran, at Ashraf 3 in Albania.

According to his testimony, individuals operating from the compound produced targeted analyses and media attacks against Iran's security and law enforcement institutions, as well as various political and social groups. Inside the network of fake accounts and front organizations Beheshti points to deceptive content-production practices at the organization's headquarters. He said the advertising department contained a room known as the "content production room," where individuals recorded videos of themselves while concealing their faces and altering their voices through editing software.

"We had been instructed that the voices must not be real and had to be changed," he said. According to Beheshti, individuals were required to conceal their faces and wear hats, while women were instructed to purchase ordinary headscarves and wear masks. The purpose, he said, was to make the recordings appear as though they had been made in Tehran or another location inside the country. The former member also discussed various media projects and social media networks operating under names and titles associated with professional groups, labor organizations and ordinary citizens.

These groups and channels were actually directed and managed from Ashraf 3 in Albania rather than from inside Iran. Among the groups he identified were the Alliance of Retirees and various protest committees. Beheshti said the logos and images used by these groups were linked to teams operating from the organization's headquarters. He identified the following organizations and channels as being based at the compound: * The organizing teams behind protests by contract oil workers. * The Coordinating Council of Nurses' Protests, which operated under the name "Aid" at Ashraf 3. * The Coordinating Council of Khorasan Protests, managed by an individual named Hadi Jahednia. * The Free Union of Iranian Workers.

According to Beheshti, all these groups were based at Ashraf 3's Compound, where their content, statements and protest-related news were produced. Beheshti also addressed the well-known and controversial "Heshmat Alavi" account, which has published purported documents concerning Iran's nuclear program and other similar material over the years. The identity behind the account had previously been the subject of uncertainty and speculation in US government circles and Western media.

According to Beheshti, the account was administered by Hanif Mojtahedzadeh. He said the organization had claimed that the account belonged to an anonymous Iranian operating inside the country or somewhere in Europe. However, Beheshti said the account had been handed over to Mojtahedzadeh by Afshin Alavi and Behnam Mohaddessin, and that Mojtahedzadeh operated it directly from Ashraf 3 under their supervision. He said this was something the organization did not want anyone to discover.

Beheshti also discussed the "Rasuyab" account, which publishes personal information about officials, security personnel and Basij bases. The account was operated by the communications and security department at Ashraf 3 under the supervision of Abbas Minachi, he said. According to his testimony, the account had no connection to individuals operating inside Iran. Organized account creation across social media platforms Responding to questions, Beheshti referred to his 17 to 18 years of experience working in the organization's internal and advertising departments.

The creation of social media accounts was a systematic organizational activity and that each individual was required to establish approximately 20 accounts across different platforms. Referring to the number of people involved in the operation, he said that an estimated 2,400 individuals, each creating 20 accounts, would give an indication of the scale of the activity. Beheshti said separate accounts were created for different social and professional groups, including nurses and retirees.

He added that the activity began in 2016 and 2017, when a group of approximately 10 to 12 people was formed. The group's mission, he said, was to establish Telegram accounts, gradually expand into the online environment and teach others how to create accounts. A broader information campaign The broad Media operation target countries opposed to US and Western policies, particularly Iran. According to the former MEK member, the organization sought to create the appearance of widespread domestic opposition by producing content outside Iran and presenting it as material generated by ordinary citizens, professional groups and protesters inside the country.

The objective was to influence public perceptions, amplify unrest-related narratives and shape the online environment in Iran in ways that could serve the organization's political interests. The testimony offers a glimpse into the mechanisms through which opposition networks seek to influence public opinion, while raising further questions about the identities behind prominent social media accounts and the origins of content presented as firsthand reporting from inside Iran.