How Britain stepped back from the brink with Israel

On Thursday a diplomatic meltdown between Britain and Israel was narrowly avoided. It was the deadline set by Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, and Gideon Saar, his foreign minister, for the closure of the British consulate in Jerusalem and the departure of 27 diplomats in retaliation for Ed Miliband’s announcement of sanctions against Israeli settlements. We were all set for a serious bust-up. Reuters was reporting that Britain had threatened to expel a proportionate number of Israeli diplomats from the embassy in London, inevitably eliciting further escalation from Israel. This tit-for-tattery would have achieved the precise opposite of Britain’s stated goals. When Miliband, the foreign secretary, announced the sanctions to parliament he promised to protect the partnership between the two countries but escalating would have done the opposite. Not least, it would have done grievous harm to a vital bilateral national security partnership. The former Mossad director Yossi Cohen told The Times’s The General and the Journalist podcast that Israel had “saved many, many lives on British soil”. Most commented 1 Time for Zelensky to go, Trump tells Ukraine in diesel row Russia-Ukraine war 936 comments 2 Tiger kills man who ‘jumped into’ pen at Yorkshire Wildlife Park 420 comments 3 Christa Pike discharged from hospital after botched execution US news 120 comments 4 Forget fragile defending, I’d much rather glorious attacking than a 6-3 Rugby union 21 comments 5 How John Swinney’s public sector plans revealed deep splits in SNP Scotland 11 comments Escalating tensions would also have played into Netanyahu’s hands. With less than three weeks to go until the Israeli election a fight with us would have been a gift for the Israeli prime minister. Instead of having to talk about why he didn’t prevent the October 7 attacks or why he was refusing to make the ultra-Orthodox do national service Netanyahu would have been in his happy place: telling the country that Israel was under siege from a hostile world and playing up his credentials as the country’s doughty defender. Israel had demanded the consulate’s closure MOSTAFA ALKHAROUF/ANDALOU/GETTY IMAGES Britain had walked into a trap. If we did not match Israel’s expulsions we would look weak. If we did match them we risked spiralling escalation. The bases of the Labour Party here and the Likud party there would have been energised by the fight. As one friend said to me it looked like both sides were enjoying this just a bit too much. But the national interest of both countries would have been damaged. Top stories 1 Starbucks ‘explores takeover’ of Chipotle Mexican Grill US business The bind they were in was this: Britain would not back down from its announcement of sanctions on Israeli settlements; Israel would not back down from its announcement of closing the Jerusalem consulate in response; Britain had made clear the counter-retaliation it would then take; Saar had made clear that every hostile step would be met by a proportionate response. As Mahatma Gandhi almost said, an eye for an eye makes everyone blind. Advertisement But Thursday arrived with a surprise compromise hammered out between the two sides. It was a complex deal in which both sides saved just enough face to step away from the brink, at least for now. The fact it was reached is much to the credit of our diplomats led by the national security adviser, Jonathan Powell, and the Foreign Office’s Middle East director. Reversing out of the trap took imagination and a steady nerve. Top stories 1 Mortgage rates dip after weeks of painful rises Mortgages The agreement was that seven British diplomats would stay on in the consulate. But it would no longer be called a consulate, instead becoming the UK mission, Jerusalem. Israel got to remove the signs; Britain got to keep the flag flying above a building that been in Jerusalem since 1838. Neither side had to cross their public red lines but both sides compromised, ultimately because the political satisfaction from escalating was outweighed by an understanding of what would be lost if we brought the pillars of the temple down — most importantly, intelligence-sharing between the two countries on shared threats. So Israel accepted that some British diplomats would stay in the building and Britain accepted that a larger number would leave. Hamas: Ed Miliband’s sanctions on Israel ‘a step in right direction’ The deal is a temporary fix. The Foreign Office has made clear that its threat of counter-retaliation is still on the table pending future discussions with the Israeli government about the departed diplomats being able to return. It is here that the real genius of the deal lies: by pushing the problem down the road to some unspecified time in the future Britain has reserved its position, preserved the principle of the British consulate and, crucially, put off the crunch point until after the Israeli election . If Israel elects a more moderate leadership then these future negotiations will be less fraught and an escalation might be avoided altogether. But even if Netanyahu and Saar remain in office we will have avoided handing them a gift-wrapped present of an issue just before the election. Advertisement Binyamin Netanyahu and his wife, Sara, attended a state memorial ceremony on the third anniversary of the October 7 attack DEBBIE HILL/POOL/AFP/GETTY IMAGES This sort of deal, though it may seem messy, is the essence of much diplomacy, which often does not solve things but creates time and space for solutions to appear. The Foreign Office can rightly be proud of what it has achieved this week. Tom Tugendhat, the shadow foreign secretary, said to me: “This could have been even worse. Our diplomats working on the bilateral relationship are untouched. Given the risk to Britain’s security as Iran continues to openly threaten us, that is no small success.” But the UK only had a crisis to diffuse because we created it. Tugendhat said: “We should never have got into this mess in the first place. Ed Miliband’s performative politics, playing to his base, have put a critical national security partnership at risk and given a boost to precisely the voices in Israeli politics who are doing most damage to the prospects for peace.” This is the nub of concern about British actions. Given we worked so hard to avoid a second fight just before the Israeli election, could we not have held the whole thing back until after the election, instead of acting when it was bound to strengthen the very government whose policies we were protesting against? Criticism of the UK’s approach has not been limited to British voices. A senior figure in the Israeli opposition told me: “This was a classic case of both sides putting political interest before policy and causing harm along the way. The sanctions were the wrong move at the wrong time. The response was badly thought out. In the end the UK government helped the Netanyahu campaign and Netanyahu gave legitimacy to Miliband’s actions against Israel. Everyone loses.” Everyone, that is, apart from the activists on the Israeli right and the British left, who disagree on many things but share a lack of concern about dismantling the valuable partnership between the two countries. For now, at least, the professionals on both sides have kept that partnership in place. Matthew Gould was the British ambassador to Israel, 2010-15