After Israel's election, a new Iran strategy is needed: Two wars have not ended the threat

Whatever the outcome of Israel's election, the next government will need to rethink its strategy toward Iran. Even if another round of fighting involving Israel, Iran and the United States proves difficult to prevent, the lessons of the past two wars suggest that greater military force alone may not deliver what has so far remained out of reach. The two military campaigns dealt severe blows to the Islamic Republic's leadership and military capabilities. Yet the regime survived, its nuclear and missile programs were not eliminated, and the new leadership in Tehran appears, at least for now, even more hardline and willing to take risks. The current state of "neither war nor peace" between Iran and the United States is unstable, but renewed fighting offers no guarantee of a decisive outcome. The transformation brought about by the war was a change within the regime, not regime change. The killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the transfer of power to his son, Mojtaba, did not bring down the institutions of the Islamic Republic. On the contrary, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has grown stronger, while the state of emergency has allowed it to deepen its grip on Iranian society. The regime is undoubtedly facing a severe economic crisis, but economic hardship does not necessarily lead to revolution. Public frustration is growing, yet the war has also reinforced feelings of national solidarity, allowing the authorities to rally some Iranians around a shared national identity. The opposition movement's organizational weaknesses, combined with the continued cohesion of the security and law enforcement apparatus, further reduce the likelihood that military strikes and economic pressure will bring down the regime in the foreseeable future. A similar reassessment is needed on the nuclear front. Operation Rising Lion deprived Iran of a significant portion of the industrial nuclear capabilities it had spent years developing. Nevertheless, Iran retained hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium, advanced centrifuges, technical expertise, skilled personnel and underground infrastructure. Moreover, the two wars may have strengthened Tehran's motivation to pursue nuclear weapons as a guarantee of regime survival and a deterrent against future attacks, although it remains unclear whether Iran's leadership has reached a final decision on the matter. Unless a solution is found to remove, destroy or reliably neutralize critical nuclear components, whether through a military operation that cannot rely solely on airstrikes or through a negotiated arrangement, Tehran may ultimately decide to break out toward nuclear weapons. Israel therefore faces a fundamental tension between at least three strategic objectives: undermining the Iranian regime's stability, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and delaying the restoration of its offensive military capabilities. Regime change could eliminate many of these threats at their source. But such an outcome depends primarily on the Iranian people and the internal struggle between the regime, its supporters and its opponents. Political transformation in Iran is certainly desirable, but there is no reliable way to predict when it might occur. Nor would strikes against Iran's national infrastructure necessarily bring about the regime's collapse. Such attacks could leave Iran an even more dysfunctional state, but failed states can survive for years and continue to pose serious threats. Israel should therefore continue working to weaken the regime through diplomatic, economic and covert means, while preparing for the possibility of a political crisis or revolutionary transition. At the same time, Israel cannot build its strategic planning around the prospect of regime change, particularly while Iran continues advancing its nuclear program and rebuilding its missile capabilities. A nuclear deal or another military campaign? On the nuclear issue, Israel faces two principal alternatives: a diplomatic agreement or military action. A negotiated arrangement could enable the removal of enriched uranium from Iran, impose restrictions on enrichment and restore effective international monitoring. But it could also provide the regime with substantial economic benefits, strengthening its position and helping it rebuild its military capabilities. An agreement could also restrict Israel's freedom of military action against Iran and potentially postpone a definitive resolution of the nuclear issue until after the current U.S. administration leaves office. Even then, it is doubtful that any agreement could adequately address every aspect of the nuclear threat or prevent Iran from pursuing a clandestine path toward nuclear weapons. The military alternative carries serious limitations of its own. Another strike that fails to address Iran's stockpile of fissile material and its underground nuclear facilities risks triggering another costly war without eliminating the threat. As long as Israel and the United States lack a credible operational solution, a meaningful diplomatic agreement, even a temporary one, would be preferable to renewing a war without a clearly defined objective. At a minimum, such an agreement should address Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium, limit its enrichment capabilities and restore effective inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the same time, any period of relative calm must be used to accelerate Israel's military buildup, expand critical stockpiles, improve intelligence and operational capabilities, and deepen military cooperation with the United States. This should include developing more effective means of dealing with Iran's underground nuclear infrastructure. The limits of military force Ultimately, the Islamic Republic is likely to continue posing significant threats to Israel for the foreseeable future. What was not achieved in the two previous military campaigns is unlikely to be achieved automatically in another round of fighting, even if greater military force is employed. To avoid becoming trapped in repeated wars that impose heavy costs on Israel without producing a lasting solution, the next government should return to the drawing board and fundamentally reassess its assumptions and strategy toward Iran. That process must begin with a sober evaluation of both the achievements and failures of the recent wars. It must acknowledge the limitations exposed in attempts to bring about political change in Iran and completely eliminate its strategic assets. Above all, it must distinguish between objectives that can realistically be achieved and those that remain beyond Israel's reach. A new strategy must be grounded in a clear-eyed assessment of reality, the definition of achievable goals and the selection of appropriate means to accomplish them. It cannot rest on wishful thinking or the assumption that using greater force will necessarily produce a different result. Dr. Raz Zimmt is director of the Iran and Shiite Axis research program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).