Pressure is the main driver of the Iran war, but for how long?

Since 2023, escalation and deterrence have served as the primary drivers of conflicts in the Middle East. Now, pressure appears to have taken root as the main factor. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi implicitly acknowledged as much on Friday after meeting Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman, when he said the <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/2026/08/28/return-to-diplomacy-not-impossible-says-araghchi-as-iran-war-hits-six-month-mark/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/2026/08/28/return-to-diplomacy-not-impossible-says-araghchi-as-iran-war-hits-six-month-mark/">door to diplomacy</a> was not closed as long as the US government recognised that “pressure doesn’t work”. This was a typical case of judging protagonists by what they do, not what they say. Yes, the US government took a significant coercive initiative with <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/us/2026/08/24/iran-sanctions-d-day-bessent/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/us/2026/08/24/iran-sanctions-d-day-bessent/">Operation Economic Outcast</a>, especially if it ultimately targets China’s so-called teapot refineries that rely on Iran’s oil supply. The combined effects of the attacks mounted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and the US Navy’s shipping embargo, have been to paralyse exports from the Arabian Gulf. Data from Kpler, the intelligence tracker, estimates that the crossings are down from 88 a day on average prior to the Iran war to just 16 today. Oil exports from the region have dropped to about 3.6 million barrels a day from about 20 million prior to the conflict. Other products from helium, vital in data centre cooling, to fertiliser to aluminium have also been severely affected. Scratch beneath the surface and Mr Araghchi’s pressure comments could have easily been directed as much <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/08/27/iran-war-divide-widens-as-ghalibaf-and-hardliner-clash-over-next-moves/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/08/27/iran-war-divide-widens-as-ghalibaf-and-hardliner-clash-over-next-moves/">at the hardliners</a> on his own side as much as his counterparts in Washington. There is no denying that $4 a gallon of petrol at the pump is having a political impact in Washington. But as this newspaper’s reporting showed last week, the queues outside Tehran’s petrol stations and the squeeze on the <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/08/26/irans-bazaar-merchants-squeezed-as-rial-hits-record-low/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/08/26/irans-bazaar-merchants-squeezed-as-rial-hits-record-low/">moribund trade</a> at the central bazaar are also devasting for Iran. Fereydun Jasemi, regional director at the National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company, revealed that more petrol was sold last Monday in Tehran than on any other day this year – such were the expectations around what US Secretary of the Treasury <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/08/30/g20-iran/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/business/economy/2026/08/30/g20-iran/">Scott Bessent</a> called “D-Day”. The seemingly prolonged nature of the stalemate is having other consequences, too. When <i>The National</i> <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/2026/06/18/france-bets-on-gulf-rebound-as-region-emerges-from-conflict/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/2026/06/18/france-bets-on-gulf-rebound-as-region-emerges-from-conflict/">talked to Nicolas Forissier</a>, the French minister of foreign trade and investment spoke about how his country was focused on efforts to ensure that the Gulf countries do not have to rely on a narrow chokepoint as their main export corridor. Knowledgeable Iranians who are focused on the prospects for their economy see the leverage that the Strait of Hormuz is granting the hardliners in Tehran as a wasting asset. In other words, the longer it is held to be played, it becomes of steadily lower value. Paktinat Hamid, an economist, said his estimate of the Gulf’s projects to <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2026/08/21/gulf-security-hormuz-us-iran-war/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2026/08/21/gulf-security-hormuz-us-iran-war/">mobilise pipelines and land export corridors</a> would see Iran’s advantages in controlling Hormuz quickly reduced by half and almost gone within three years. Saudi Arabia’s reliance on the corridor would drop from 70 per cent to just 15 per cent. Iraq’s dependence would drop from 100 per cent to 30 per cent. It’s small wonder, then, that figures like Mr Araghchi continue talks with countries such as Pakistan, Oman and Qatar – and through them, ultimately with the US. It’s also unsurprising that there is a parallel squeeze on the Bab Al Mandeb strait. A recent report has found that the Houthis, who control Yemen’s western seaboard, are not only stepping up attacks on Saudi oil export tankers but have used Hezbollah-style strategies to create a web of influence across the Horn of Africa. With news of drones and weaponry expertise <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uk/2026/08/26/houthis-grow-smuggling-networks-in-african-conflicts/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/uk/2026/08/26/houthis-grow-smuggling-networks-in-african-conflicts/">moving across the Red Sea</a> and into countries such as Sudan and Somalia – where the Sudanese Armed Forces and Al Shabab act as major forces of instability – the development risks fuelling the region’s problems. It is possible that this also lays the ground for a chokehold stretching across the Red Sea that would be majorly problematic for the global economy. The Houthi grip on one of the world’s busiest trade corridors gives their patrons in the IRGC an <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/editorial/2026/08/28/the-houthis-reach-into-africa-should-alarm-the-world/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/editorial/2026/08/28/the-houthis-reach-into-africa-should-alarm-the-world/">unbeatable second point of leverage</a> over shipping and basic commodities. And it is not just basic commodities but processed goods, too. Even items like North Sea fish can be sent to China for processing and come back as ready-to-eat fillets. This weeks-long but very cheap frozen trade is one of the many layers of the global economy that has developed under freedom of navigation. While the US has no active counter-pressure in the Red Sea just now, it is worth remembering that the Europeans are still committed to the <a href="https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2026/07/13/strait-of-hormuz-iran-us-gulf-uk-france-europe-mission-shipping-security/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer" title="https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2026/07/13/strait-of-hormuz-iran-us-gulf-uk-france-europe-mission-shipping-security/">Aspides coalition of warships</a> that maintained the cargo trade when the Houthis responded to Israel’s war in Gaza with a partial blockage of the sea lanes around Yemen. It is an unproven gamble for the Houthi leadership to assume that it can exercise strategic command over an area as vast as the Red Sea with so many countries holding a stake in it. Like the IRGC, it may find the concept of “control by force” more magnificent than the day-to-day reality of what that entails. For one thing, the neighbours and the wider world will eventually adapt. There is a second flaw in this theory of pressure. The US is practically not much affected by the disruption, as President Donald Trump often says. If these moves are designed to send a direct message to Washington, the signal might be heard but the pain brought to bear is nothing of the magnitude that Iran and its allies are seeking to inflict. The pressure phase is of course real, and the dangers from it are felt far and wide. But, ultimately, its impact on the chokepoints is so uneven and irregular that the only real substitute for deterrence is a standstill to the hostilities or even a deal.