Tehran Times opinion piece, on Iran, 18 November 2026

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The nuclear pretext and the politics of perpetual pressure

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Goa, India – Enrichment is not weaponisation. A country's technological capability is not proof of its intention to build a bomb. Yet Iran is being subjected to sanctions, military attacks, intelligence operations and international intimidation, while the nuclear double standards governing West Asia remain unchallenged. For years, Iran has been made to live under the shadow of an impending nuclear catastrophe that has yet to materialise.

Its nuclear programme is repeatedly presented as an existential threat to the world, its uranium enrichment as proof of an intention to manufacture nuclear weapons, and its technological advancement as justification for sanctions, isolation, intelligence operations and military threats. The argument is repeated so relentlessly that the distinction between what Iran is actually doing and what its adversaries allege it intends to do has almost disappeared from international discourse.

The more fundamental question is whether the nuclear controversy is really about preventing nuclear proliferation or whether it has become the convenient instrument through which Iran is denied its sovereignty, its legitimate technological aspirations and its right to determine its own political future. Iran is not known to possess a nuclear weapon. There is no publicly established evidence that it has assembled one. Its uranium enrichment programme, including the enrichment of uranium to 60 per cent U-235, is a matter of international scrutiny and legitimate concern.

But enrichment is not weaponisation. The possession of enriched uranium is not the same as manufacturing a nuclear bomb. Nor does the capacity to produce weapons-grade material automatically establish a political decision to manufacture a weapon. The continuing attempt to collapse these distinctions is at the centre of the campaign against Iran. The politics of a manufactured nuclear emergency The nuclear controversy has developed against a much wider political background.

Iran has been subjected to decades of American sanctions, diplomatic isolation, economic restrictions, covert operations and military intimidation. Its regional relationships have been treated as a threat to Western interests, while its independent foreign policy has frequently been presented as an unacceptable challenge to the existing geopolitical order. The nuclear programme has provided the most convenient justification for this continuing pressure.

The irony is that the United States' own intelligence community stated in its 2025 Annual Threat Assessment that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon and that the then Supreme Leader had not authorised the resumption of the weapons programme suspended in 2003. The assessment did not rule out the possibility of a future change in Iranian policy, particularly given the country's expanding enrichment capabilities. But it did not substantiate the repeated claims that Iran was actively constructing a nuclear bomb.

The Congressional Research Service, in its October 2026 assessment, acknowledges that the present status of Iran's nuclear programme is unclear following the military attacks and the disruption of international monitoring. It also records that a June 2026 memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States included an Iranian reaffirmation that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons. These are important facts. They deserve far more attention than the politically convenient declarations that Iran is perpetually on the verge of producing a bomb.

There are distinct stages in the nuclear process. Uranium enrichment, the production of weapons-grade fissile material, the engineering of a nuclear explosive device and its integration into a deliverable weapon are distinct stages of the nuclear fuel cycle and weapons development. Weapons-grade uranium is generally enriched to approximately 90 per cent U-235. These technical distinctions are essential to an accurate assessment of Iran's nuclear programme and to avoiding the conflation of nuclear technology with the development of nuclear weapons.

The peacemaker who returned to the politics of force Donald Trump entered his second presidency presenting himself as a leader who could end wars and bring peace through personal diplomacy and deal-making. He repeatedly claimed credit for resolving numerous international conflicts and cultivated the image of a president who would keep America out of prolonged military entanglements. His record, however, has become increasingly difficult to reconcile with that self-image.

In January 2026, American forces conducted a military operation in Venezuela, striking targets in Caracas and capturing President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, who were transported to the United States. Trump subsequently announced that Washington would temporarily run Venezuela and spoke about exploiting the country's enormous oil resources. The operation raised serious questions about sovereignty, international law and the legitimacy of forcibly removing a head of state through military intervention.

The assault on Iran in February 2026 took this reliance on military force to an altogether different scale. The point is not to make Trump the central character of the Iranian nuclear controversy. His political theatrics are only one expression of a much older American approach to international relations: the assumption that military superiority, financial sanctions and diplomatic intimidation entitle Washington to determine the choices of other nations.

The speculation that Trump might seek one more decisive military confrontation before presenting himself as the president who finally brought peace to West Asia should be treated cautiously. There is no confirmed strategy of a predetermined 'final war'. However, Washington has repeatedly threatened renewed military action, and American officials have been considering further operations even as diplomatic contacts continue. There is a significant difference between military capability and the wisdom or political feasibility of exercising it.

Trump may still order another attack, but he cannot assume that the American public will accept another prolonged war, particularly after the consequences of the existing confrontation. The limits of American power The United States remains a formidable military power. Its military bases, aircraft carriers, advanced weapons systems and financial influence give it the capacity to inflict immense damage. But military superiority is not the same as political authority, and the capacity to destroy is not the capacity to govern, negotiate or secure lasting obedience.

This distinction has become increasingly visible in West Asia. Washington can impose sanctions, maintain naval blockades, launch airstrikes and threaten further military operations. What it cannot automatically do is compel Iran to surrender its sovereignty, dictate the future of its political system or secure a regional settlement entirely on American terms. The old image of America as the indispensable global arbiter is increasingly difficult to sustain.

Other countries have their own strategic interests, regional relationships and diplomatic initiatives. The current efforts by Qatar, and the parallel discussions involving regional powers, demonstrate that the diplomatic future of West Asia cannot be reduced to decisions taken in Washington. The United States can remain an enormously consequential military actor while becoming a much less credible political broker. Its behaviour increasingly resembles that of an overbearing bully: capable of causing immense damage, but unable to guarantee that those subjected to its pressure will submit.

Iran has demonstrated precisely this limitation. It has not simply absorbed military attacks. It has retaliated and demonstrated that a prolonged confrontation carries substantial costs for its adversaries and the wider international economy. The Strait of Hormuz has become a strategic pressure point, and the disruption of shipping and energy supplies has demonstrated the vulnerability of global markets to a conflict that Washington initially expected to resolve through overwhelming military superiority.

None of this means that Iran is invulnerable, or that the war has been without enormous costs for its people and the region. But the expectation that Iran would quickly collapse or surrender under American and Israeli military pressure has not materialised. That is the essential strategic lesson. The American political backlash The consequences of the Iran war have also returned to American domestic politics. The November 3, 2026 midterm elections delivered a significant defeat to Trump's Republican Party, with Democrats winning control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

The outcome reflected widespread dissatisfaction with the administration on several issues, particularly the cost of living, inflation, economic insecurity and the decision to pursue the war against Iran. Vice-President JD Vance made an unusually explicit admission of the political damage. In his assessment of the electoral defeat, he wrote: "The reason we lost is the war." He argued that voters who had supported Trump and him in 2024 had switched allegiance partly because of the Iran conflict, the cost of living, the demand to put America first and dissatisfaction with the country's relationship with Israel.

Trump himself acknowledged that the war had contributed to the Republican setback, although he insisted that he would have made the same decision again. The election results should not be attributed exclusively to Iran. American voters had several grievances, and polling indicated that the economy and corruption were important factors. Nevertheless, the Iran war had become a major political liability. The conflict had pushed up fuel prices, created uncertainty in energy markets and raised questions about American casualties and the purpose of continuing military operations.

The political irony is difficult to miss. A military campaign intended to demonstrate American power and secure Trump's international legacy instead became one of the issues that weakened his domestic political position. Iran did not determine the American election. American voters did. But Iran's refusal to capitulate, and Washington's inability to secure a quick and decisive political outcome, helped turn the war into an electoral liability for Trump.

Vance's reservations are particularly significant. He had been among the sceptics within the administration regarding the wisdom of entering the war, even though he supported the President's decision after it was taken. His subsequent admission of the political cost indicates that important differences exist within the Republican establishment about the consequences of continuing the confrontation. The possibility of another major military operation cannot be ruled out.

But an administration that has already lost control of Congress and faces public dissatisfaction with the war cannot ignore the political consequences of escalating it further. The inspection question: What is Iran actually refusing? Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Its obligations under this agreement are binding.

The treaty recognises the right of its parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, subject to their non-proliferation obligations. It is important to distinguish these mandatory safeguards from the Additional Protocol, which provides enhanced inspection powers and is a voluntary instrument. Iran suspended implementation of the Additional Protocol in 2021 and also stopped providing several JCPOA-specific monitoring arrangements.

Following the military attacks on its nuclear installations in 2025 and 2026, the inspection situation deteriorated further. The IAEA has been unable to obtain the necessary access to the affected facilities and has not been able to verify the present location and status of all the enriched uranium material. According to the IAEA's September 2026 report, the agency has been unable to conduct on-site verification at Iran's declared nuclear facilities during the reporting period.

Maintaining cooperation between Iran and the IAEA is important for addressing outstanding questions and ensuring transparency. At the same time, the impact of military attacks on nuclear facilities must be taken into account, as damage to these sites can make monitoring and verification more difficult. The absence of on-site verification should not, on its own, be interpreted as evidence of nuclear weaponisation. A sustainable solution requires diplomatic engagement, respect for international safeguards and conditions that allow the IAEA to resume its work.

Israel's nuclear exemption The international treatment of Iran becomes even more difficult to defend when considered alongside Israel's nuclear arsenal. Israel is widely estimated to possess approximately 90 nuclear warheads. It maintains a policy of nuclear opacity, neither officially confirming nor denying its possession of nuclear weapons. It is not a signatory to the NPT and does not place its nuclear installations under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

This is the most glaring double standard in the nuclear politics of West Asia. Iran, a signatory to the NPT, is subjected to extraordinary international pressure over its enrichment programme and the possibility that it might eventually manufacture nuclear weapons. Israel, an established undeclared nuclear power, is not subjected to equivalent demands for transparency and accountability. Why is Iran required to prove that

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About this analysis

This is an opinion piece arguing that Iran's enrichment is not proof of a weapons programme and that US and Israeli pressure on Iran amounts to a double standard. Its central points rest on a 2025 US intelligence assessment, a Congressional Research Service report and IAEA reporting, all named in the text. Several factual claims, including the Venezuela operation, the February 2026 attack on Iran and the estimate of Israel's warheads, carry no named source, and no findings are raised.

Opinion piece: read for false claims of fact and for fairness to the people it names, not for its opinions.

What it gets right

  • “the United States' own intelligence community stated in its 2025 Annual Threat Assessment”

    It names the source and the document behind its central claim about Iran's weapons programme, so the reader can check the attribution.

  • “The election results should not be attributed exclusively to Iran.”

    It limits its own argument and says other voter grievances, including the economy and corruption, mattered, which the next sentences set out.

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