'I wanted Gaza swallowed by the sea': Ben-Gurion's 1956 remarks revealed

"If I were to believe in a miracle, I would want it to be swallowed by the sea." This is how Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, described his feelings about the Gaza Strip while talking to IDF officers after the 1956 Sinai War. During the conversation, the Prime Minister reiterated what he had said before the operation, presenting the capture of the Gaza Strip as a military necessity. Months later, when asked to explain why he opposed its annexation, he explained to the officers the price he believed Israel would pay if it remained there.

Documentation of the conversation is part of the collection the Defense Ministry's IDF Archives published on Sunday, marking 70 years since the Sinai War, officially known as Operation Kadesh. The dedicated portal launched by the archive (in Hebrew) includes original documents, maps, more than 4,500 images, and information on 149 commanders who served in the war. Operation Kadesh was launched on October 29th, 1956, following a period of attacks launched from the Gaza Strip, the closure of the Tiran Strait, and the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Within days, the IDF seized control of the Gaza Strip and large swaths of the Sinai Peninsula, as the UK and France fought to seize the canal. Due to international pressure, led in part by the United States, Israel withdrew from the territories it had occupied in the war. IDF forces in Sinai, 1956 Photo: Bamachane Magazine photographer/IDF Archives During the conversation with the officers, Ben-Gurion explained that the Egyptian troop concentration in the Gaza Strip posed a threat to Israel even before the war.

He estimated that if the forces launched a surprize attack, they would be able to reach the outskirts of Tel Aviv. He also mentioned the infiltrations by Fedayeen terrorists, the attacks, and sabotage from which residents of the border areas, including those in the kibbutzim Nahal Oz and Nirim, suffered. "I knew this, but there are larger considerations," he stated, "Therefore, from the outset, I opposed those who demanded that Gaza be annexed."

Among those at the core of Ben-Gurion's considerations was the Gazan population. According to figures he conveyed to the officers, 300,000 residents lived in the enclave, including between 180 and 190 thousand refugees from Israel. He mentioned the houses and fields they left behind in the south of the country and in the Ramla and Rehovot areas, and estimated that even after the departure of the Egyptian forces, an underground movement will continue to operate in the Strip, forcing Israel to deal with terror for a long time.

Ben-Gurion visits Sinai Photo: Karmi Boris, IDF Archive Adding to the security concerns were the diplomatic and moral costs. Ben-Gurion warned that continued Israeli control of the Gaza Strip in the face of UN opposition would deepen Israel's international isolation, and that suppressing terrorism over an extended period could damage the country's standing abroad and erode domestic support for the move. He also feared that Israel would struggle to obtain weapons in a time of crisis and could find itself fighting armies equipped with superior aircraft and tanks.

Ben-Gurion explained that Operation Kadesh had been planned with the aim of minimizing casualties and warned that in a future war, the civilian population would also find itself on the front lines. "Tel Aviv will be bombed, Haifa will be bombed, and people will be killed. Not soldiers. Women, children," he told the officers. In another newly released transcript, Shimon Peres, then Director-General of the Defense Ministry, described the difficulties Israel faced in obtaining weapons during the War of Independence.

According to Peres, most of the weapons came from Czechoslovakia, while Israel also secretly purchased arms from France, Italy, Switzerland, and England. During the same discussion, Peres recalled how Ben-Gurion viewed the balance of power between Israel and the Arab states: "A victory for us in battle does not necessarily mean it will be the last battle. But an Arab victory could be the final victory."