Sudan Dialogue Preparatory Committee Seeks Ceasefire as War Between Army and RSF Continues

No two people differ over the fact that Sudan is living through a harsh ordeal imposed by the war, its consequences, and the interventions in it, or that the Sudanese citizen is paying the heaviest price today. Anyone walking the streets of Khartoum's three cities sees the enormous scale of the destruction and feels the severity of people's suffering- while feeling at the same time how firmly they hold to the hope that the country will recover and regain its health. Out of the heart of this suffering comes the initiative of the dialogue preparatory committee: an initiative whose purpose is to prepare and facilitate the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue rather than monopolize it, and whose task is to bring the parties together on the way to a comprehensive national consensus. Since it began its work this week, the committee has affirmed its openness to everyone, having obtained the guarantees required from the state to facilitate the convening of the dialogue and to protect the participants and their safety. In its statement and its public remarks, the committee stressed that it is not imposing a ready-made agenda on those attending, but working to bridge the gap between the parties through meetings and consultations, so as to arrive at an agenda they agree upon. Nor does the committee carry predetermined outcomes to dictate to anyone; the participants determine their own outcomes, by consensus. And although the aim is specifically a dialogue convened inside Sudan, the state will not be the body calling for it, nor the body that sets its agenda or its outcomes. Its role is confined to providing the logistical support and the legal, political, and security guarantees necessary for it to convene in a safe environment. These guarantees have been given legal form through decrees recorded in the official gazette, affording protection to those taking part in the dialogue and to anyone wishing to express an opinion from outside its hall. The dialogue that is needed is not merely a conference or a political meeting. It is a national process resting on the genuine participation of the various political, civil, and community components, and seeking consensus and the gathering together of what has been scattered. Any regional or international support should likewise assist the Sudanese dialogue rather than substitute for Sudanese decision-making. What is striking is the scale of the response to the initiative- from the various forces, from the Sudanese street, and on social media, as well as the regional and international interest. The African Union Commission's swift welcome of the initiative, as a dialogue run from inside Sudan and by a committee of its own people, has given this course an important push, particularly with its affirmation of the principles of inclusiveness and of Sudanese ownership and leadership. But some voices have criticized this position, going so far as to hold that supporting a dialogue in the country's capital amounts to supporting Sudan's partition. Here it is legitimate to ask: how can supporting dialogue in Khartoum, the country's capital, be an entry point to partitioning Sudan? Is holding the dialogue in the capital of the state not an affirmation of its unity and its sovereignty? And conversely, does keeping the capital out of this course, even indirectly, not carry the risk of entrenching the reality of parallel authorities and the notions of partition? The initiative, in essence, seeks to gather Sudanese around a single table to raise their country's issues and its troubles, beneath a ceiling of clear national fundamentals that protect its sovereignty and its unity. There are also those who say the dialogue cannot begin before the war stops, and that there is no sense in sitting at a political table while the fighting continues. But making a halt to the war a precondition may in practice mean disabling the political track and leaving the country hostage to military operations and to foreign interventions, while citizens' suffering worsens. It is more useful to see the dialogue as one of the tracks that can help stop the war than as an outcome to be waited for before any dialogue begins. The war did not arise from nothing. It was preceded by disputes, wrangling, and struggles of exclusion that paralyzed the transitional period and charged the atmosphere, until the brandishing of war rose louder than the voice of reason. Agreement among the political, civil, and community forces on a road map out of the crisis, and on arrangements leading in the end to elections and civilian rule, can therefore create the environment needed to end the war. And amid a deep crisis of trust, the dialogue need not begin with the most contentious issues. It can begin with what unites Sudanese, in order to build confidence, and then move to the thornier files with deliberation and patience. The consultations should also include women, young people, the displaced, refugees, and Sudanese abroad, so as to reflect the reality of Sudanese diversity. The deeper significance of the initiative is that the dialogue should take place in the embrace of the homeland rather than in the hotels of foreign capitals, and that Sudanese should hear one another amid their country's suffering rather than from behind walls of distance. The longer the war lasts, the greater the need for Sudanese to recover the reins of their own decision. Sudan does not need political wrangling at this moment. It needs Sudanese sitting together to talk about its future. If stopping the war is the urgent objective, then building consensus is the road to it; and if what is required is that this be the last of Sudan's wars, that must begin with a comprehensive Sudanese dialogue that imposes no tutelage on anyone and places the interest of the homeland above the interests of the disputants. Perhaps the most important step toward ending the war is that Sudanese should find, at last, a table with room at its edges for everyone.

Sudanese anti-war political and civil forces have rejected the African Union’s endorsement of a “Sudanese-Sudanese Dialogue Initiative” proposed by Sovereignty Council President and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan, warning that the process could legitimise military rule and deepen Sudan’s division. In a memorandum submitted on September 2 to the African Peace and Security Council and the AU Political Affairs, Peace and Security Commission, the groups rejected the AU Commission’s August 31 statement welcoming the initiative. They said the endorsement contradicted the Peace and Security Council’s position that a humanitarian truce should lead to an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire before any political process. They also criticised the AU for backing an initiative proposed by El Burhan, whose October 2021 military coup resulted in Sudan’s suspension from AU activities. The groups stressed that dialogue itself was not the problem but argued that any credible political process must be genuinely Sudanese-owned, with participants, agenda and timing agreed by Sudanese stakeholders. They called for the humanitarian crisis and cessation of hostilities to remain at the centre of the process. They also demanded the exclusion of the National Congress Party, the Islamic Movement and affiliated forces, which they accused of playing a documented role in starting and prolonging the war. The memorandum warned that holding dialogue in territory controlled by one side of the conflict, without a prior ceasefire or broad participation, could entrench the political and territorial fragmentation created by the war. The groups called on the AU to explain its endorsement, reaffirm its ceasefire-first position, maintain neutrality and coordinate international mediation efforts, including the Quartet and Quintet mechanism. The AU Commission said its support was based on the need for an inclusive process involving Sudanese civil, political and societal actors. It said the dialogue should ultimately lead to a united, sovereign Sudan governed by legitimate civilian institutions, with a single national security structure and peaceful mechanisms for resolving political differences. Othman Mirghani, spokesman for the Sudanese-Sudanese Dialogue Committee, welcomed the AU statement, saying it came at a crucial stage as the committee began its work. Speaking to Radio Dabanga, Mirghani said regional backing could help secure wider international support while preserving the committee’s independence. He said the initiative sought direct dialogue among Sudanese inside the country and that the AU could help facilitate contacts with the UN, United States, UK and European Union. The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces aligned-government,Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasees), also rejected the AU endorsement, describing it as support for the army’s position and bias towards one side of the conflict. Tasees spokesperson Ahmed Tagad Lisan said El Burhan had called for the dialogue, formed its preparatory committee and determined its agenda and venue, giving the SAF’s leadership undue influence over the process. The anti-war forces reiterated that they remain open to dialogue but insisted that a credible process must first stop the fighting, protect civilians and prevent the war from being used to legitimise competing centres of power.

The head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, issued yesterday, Tuesday, a decision to expunge the charges filed against any Sudanese residing outside the country who entered or will enter Sudan for the purpose of participating in the national dialogue. Justice Minister Abdullah Durf said, in statements carried by the Sudanese News Agency, that the decision came in response to the National Initiative for launching the Sudanese–Sudanese dialogue, which proposed providing guarantees for participants in the dialogue. President Burhan granting participants in the dialogue a temporary guarantee. Durf explained that Burhan approved the expunging of charges against Sudanese expatriates who return to the country to participate in the dialogue, stressing that the move stems from the belief that national consensus through dialogue is a path to rebuilding the state. The decision comes in tandem with the launch of the Dialogue Preparation Committee, which includes 19 figures, a initiative aimed at creating the necessary conditions to begin a dialogue among political, civil, and social forces, contributing to halting the war and paving the way for national consensus. The Justice Minister affirmed that the state’s role will be limited to providing guarantees, facilitation, and protection necessary to preserve the independence of the dialogue and prevent interference in setting its agenda. He noted that the decision responds to the Sudanese people’s aspirations for a national path that places their concerns and preoccupations at the forefront. Earlier, member of the Dialogue Committee Suleiman al-Amin announced on Sunday the launch of an independent national effort to prepare the conditions for dialogue, explaining that the initiative aims to facilitate preliminary consultations and prevent a slide toward further fighting, restoring Sudan to a path that preserves its unity and the stability of its institutions. The committee also called for a secure environment for dialogue, along with clear, written, and verifiable guarantees for participants, including the cessation of charges against Sudanese expatriates upon their entry to the country to participate in the dialogue, if such charges are linked to their political views and positions.

Summary We expect that field developments will force a redesign of the dialogue itself. If the army continues to improve its positions and the Rapid Support Forces’ ability to keep a cohesive force wanes, the initiative may shift from a broad political dialogue to more direct negotiations about post-war arrangements. If the fronts settle, dialogue will become a necessity to manage an enduring balance. On Sunday, the Sudanese Committee launched an initiative to create favorable conditions for a comprehensive Sudanese dialogue that includes political, civilian, and societal forces, aiming to contribute to a ceasefire and open a path toward national consensus on the country’s future. The announcement came during the first press conference of the Sudanese Dialogue Preparation Committee, which includes 19 Sudanese figures and is chaired by Qassim Badri, President of Al-Ahfad University. The committee presented its initiative as an independent national mechanism to prepare the climate for dialogue and indicated its openness to various Sudanese forces and actors. The initiative enjoys the support of the Chairman of the Sovereign Council, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who said that a group of Sudanese men and women took the initiative from the conviction that overcoming the crisis cannot be achieved except through a purely Sudanese dialogue that includes all political and societal forces and prioritizes citizens’ suffering and their right to peace. al-Burhan explained that the group presented its vision as an independent mechanism to prepare for a comprehensive dialogue, noting the state’s approval to provide logistical support and the necessary legal, political, and security guarantees for its convening and participation of its parties. He stressed that the state will not be the organizer of the dialogue nor the one to define its agenda and outputs. The announcement comes after statements by Sudan’s Foreign Minister, Mayu al-Din Salem, on August 19, saying that his country would soon announce the start of the Sudanese dialogue. Earlier, al-Burhan announced the start of talks with national and factional forces that supported the state, its unity, and its institutions, with the aim of involving them in completing the state’s institutions, including the formation of the Legislative Council, which he described as a constitutional entitlement, at a time when the war between the army and the RSF has continued since April 2023. The committee presents this step amid ongoing fighting, a worsening humanitarian crisis, and displacement, alongside growing calls to end the war and pave a political path that includes Sudanese people of various components and political directions. Guarantees and Key Arrangements The main arrangements announced for the dialogue initiative relate to legal and political guarantees for participants. The Sovereign Council chairman issued Decree No. 363 for 2026, ordering the removal of criminal reports filed by state agencies against Sudanese inside the country or abroad when connected to acts or statements deemed political opinions or positions, with the dropping of resulting charges. Justice Minister Abdullah Darf stated that the decree is a direct response to the dialogue initiative’s demands and that judiciary, police, security, and other relevant authorities are obliged to implement it. During a press conference in Khartoum, Darf explained that guarantees extend beyond purging reports to include temporary procedural immunity for participants in consultations and dialogue, starting from their entry into the country until their departure after participation ends, to prevent criminal proceedings against them during this period. They also cover protection of views and positions raised within the consultations and dialogue, so that they do not become grounds for criminal action due to positions or proposals related to the dialogue topic. The minister noted that combatants who surrender voluntarily are not covered by this measure, but they remain subject to previous amnesty arrangements. Earlier, al-Burhan had clarified that the suspension of criminal proceedings does not mean a full amnesty or a waiver of the rights of complainants; rather, it represents a temporary guarantee allowing participants to return and participate without legal pursuit blocking their attendance. He also affirmed that the state would provide protection, facilities, and legal, political, and security guarantees, without interfering in selecting participants or determining the dialogue’s agenda or outputs. The Preparation Committee had, for its part, requested guarantees that are “clear, written, and verifiable,” including a halt to reports related to political positions, protection for participants, and a general climate that permits freedom of expression, as well as safeguarding the dialogue venues and preventing influence on its outputs. Committee member Suleiman al-Amin stated that the committee’s role is to listen to the concerns and proposals of different forces and to bring viewpoints closer, culminating in a shared vision on the conditions, methodology, guarantees, and agenda of the dialogue, without imposing a pre-set path. Divergent Positions The stance of Sudan’s political and civil forces toward the call for dialogue ranges from cautious welcome to conditional rejection. The Democratic Block welcomed the initiative, while the Original Democratic Union Party expressed openness to a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue, with party adviser Hatem al-Sirr participating in preparatory consultations. In contrast, the Civil Democratic Coalition for the Forces of the Revolution (Smoud) rejected participating in a dialogue that would take place within areas under army control, arguing that it could legitimize what it calls the “reality-based authority.” The Federal Union, the Arab Socialist Baath Party, and the Sudan Liberation Movement under Abdul-Wahid Muhammad Nur joined this stance, along with al-Ummah Party – Reform and Renewal and other civil, feminist, and youth forces. Activist Anwar Othman said this reservation does not mean closing the door to dialogue, but rather rejecting turning it into a separate track from the war. He explained that the core crisis lies in the absence of a balanced political framework capable of producing national consensus, especially given the absence of parliament and transitional institutions, and the dispersion of military control across Sudan’s geography. He added that while the legal and security guarantees are important to reassure participants, they do not answer the political question of who sets the dialogue rules, who guarantees its independence, and how its outputs will be implemented. He believes conducting the process in a region controlled by one party to the conflict creates a mismatch in the bargaining balance, even with protection and immunities. Othman said stopping the war should be part of engineering the political process, not a deferred promise at the end, because continued fighting reshapes power dynamics and makes dialogue dependent on military realities. He stressed that the opposing camp does not oppose negotiations but wants an independent dialogue, with balanced representation, a clear agenda, and supported by arrangements to stop the war, so the political settlement does not become a temporary truce that reproduces the conflict. An Expected Settlement Many observers see the dialogue proposal as occurring at a moment when politics cannot be separated from battlefield power. The army has made battlefield gains in North Kordofan and indications of cracks within the RSF, placing the political phase in a position of relative advantage, while the war remains open and subject to military shifts. Therefore, the initiative does not look like a simple shift from war to politics but rather synchronized management of both tracks: military pressure to improve negotiation terms and a political path to re-order the civilian sphere before the balance of conflict is finally settled. Sudanese university professor Ahmed Khalifa says the initiative’s importance is not measured by the number of participants at the table, but by its ability to produce a viable settlement. For dialogue to become a tool to end the war, there must be a clear distinction between the state as a unifying framework and the governing authority as a party with direct interests in the process’s outputs. This is the test point, especially since civil society forces opposed to the war rejected the proposed formula and tied any political track to creating a more neutral environment. Khalifa noted that the deeper problem lies in shifting from battlefield logic to the dialogue hall; parties that measure their weight by military strength will treat negotiation as an extension of conflict, not a search for a historic settlement. Therefore, the files of joint forces allied with the army, the future of the security apparatus, and arrangements for the transitional authority will remain the most sensitive issues because they bear on the core distribution of power within the state. He added that while dialogue may succeed in opening a political channel, it will not become a path to ending the war unless paired with verifiable security arrangements, reciprocal guarantees, and an independent implementation mechanism. The real gamble is not to gather rivals but to translate the changing balance of power into a settlement that does not reproduce war in a new form. In this sense, the initiative may mark the beginning of a political path, but it is not yet evidence of Sudan moving from a war logic to a settlement logic. A Gradual Path It appears the future of Sudanese dialogue is likely to move along a gradual path. The current environment allows starting limited political contacts but does not yet provide conditions for a final settlement, as military operations continue despite the army’s improved battlefield position, especially in Kordofan, enabling the conversion of military pressure into negotiation leverage. At the same time, RSF forces have not yet reached a stage of losing maneuverability, despite pressures and defections within its ranks. The dialogue is expected to become a preliminary track, with expanded contacts and a broader base of participants, and with consensus-building regarding the shape of the authority and the transitional period, without an immediate resolution of the military file; this is the most realistic near-term scenario. A second scenario envisions a widening gap between civil forces opposing the initiative, led by Smoud and its allies, and those who see dialogue as an opportunity to rebuild the state institutions. In that case, two parallel political tracks could emerge, undermining the capacity to produce a single national reference. Civil society forces have already rejected the current formula, demanding a ceasefire before the political process. A third scenario, the most strategically important, is that battlefield developments will impose a redesign of the dialogue itself. If the army continues to improve its positions and the RSF’s ability to maintain a cohesive force wanes, the initiative may shift from a broad political dialogue to more direct negotiations about post-war arrangements. If the fronts settle, dialogue will become a necessity to manage a long-term balance.