Britain is spending £2.4 billion on military satellites, but who really controls them?

Prime Minister Andy Burnham is reportedly holding up approval of a £2.4 billion contract for Britain's next generation of military satellites over concerns about British jobs. The competition between Airbus and Lockheed Martin has become a significant political and industrial dispute, with thousands of skilled jobs potentially affected. These concerns are understandable, but the decision also raises serious questions about Britain's ability to operate independently during a military crisis.

In September, the Government published its new UK Space Strategy , supported by £7.8 billion of planned funding through to 2030, promising greater resilience, sovereign capabilities and an integrated national satellite communications network. It explicitly commits to maintaining Skynet as the foundation of Britain's sovereign military communications, supported by allied and commercial services. These are sensible ambitions. Given the controversy surrounding the Skynet procurement, ministers now need to show how they will deliver it.

The urgency of that question became clear this week when suspected cyberattacks disrupted supermarket refrigeration systems across Europe. In Belgium, Ireland and Sweden, temperatures rose sharply, forcing retailers to remove or discard food. On 3 November, the head of Britain's National Cyber Security Centre confirmed that vulnerable technology had also been exploited in a small number of cases affecting the UK food supply chain. The incidents demonstrate how vulnerabilities in remotely managed equipment can have consequences far beyond a computer screen.

Britain's military systems are more heavily protected, but ministers should be asking equally difficult questions about who can access them and what happens when those systems fail. Ukraine has exposed another form of vulnerability. For approximately ten days, Ukrainian forces experienced restrictions on the American Starshield satellite network, leaving some drones unable to maintain reliable connections above approximately 100mph. Among the systems affected were interceptors designed to destroy fast-moving Russian attack drones, while strikes against Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure continued.

The restrictions were lifted on 24 October , with Ukrainian officials confirming stable connections at speeds exceeding 400 kilometres per hour. However, the circumstances surrounding the disruption remain disputed. As a Ukrainian living in Britain, I find it deeply troubling that forces defending their country against an invasion could suddenly lose access to technology they urgently need, with little ability to resolve the problem themselves.

American military support has been extraordinarily important to Ukraine, and I remain profoundly grateful. Nevertheless, the disruption exposed a vulnerability that every European defence ministry ought to be examining. The circumstances are different. Supermarket equipment appears to have been accessed without authorisation, while Ukraine faced restrictions on a service it relied upon. But both demonstrate how quickly essential capabilities can be lost, and how difficult restoring them can become when control rests elsewhere.

Britain has a direct interest in this issue. According to figures disclosed by the Ministry of Defence to Reuters in September, our armed forces already operate approximately 1,000 Starshield terminals, having spent around £13 million on the service. The arrangements governing British access may differ, but our military already relies on this technology. Britain owns its Skynet satellite constellation, although a consortium led by Babcock manages day-to-day operations.

The Government regards Skynet as a sovereign capability, with freedom of action and operational independence built into its requirements. Yet as military communications increasingly combine British satellites with commercial and allied services, the practical arrangements deserve rigorous scrutiny. Can British engineers modify and restore essential services without external approval? What happens when a supplier becomes unavailable, communications are disrupted or an ally's political priorities suddenly change?

These questions should be addressed before the next contract is awarded. I have similar concerns about Britain's wider preparedness for attacks on military infrastructure. The Ministry of Defence recorded 266 drone incidents near British military sites in 2025, compared with 126 the previous year. The Government has proposed stronger powers for military personnel to respond, although the figures demonstrate how quickly the security environment is changing.

Through my work connecting British and Ukrainian defence innovators, I regularly encounter sophisticated technology capable of addressing emerging threats. Yet the practical ability to deploy and adapt such systems can be constrained by procurement arrangements, regulatory requirements and complicated chains of authorisation. I have been particularly concerned by restrictions surrounding electronic jamming, where legitimate civilian safety considerations must be balanced against the need to respond quickly to hostile drones.

Britain needs procedures that remain workable under pressure, when commanders may have minutes rather than days to make decisions. The technical expertise required to maintain and adapt our military communications is just as important as the equipment itself. Europe is already addressing its own satellite dependencies. The EU's GOVSATCOM programme began providing secure satellite communications this year, while its more ambitious IRIS project will deliver a 348-satellite network for government, military and emergency services, with the first launches scheduled for 2029.

Britain is not currently a participant in IRIS , despite holding a stake in Eutelsat, one of the companies delivering it. As Europe invests in secure communications infrastructure, Britain needs greater clarity about its future access and how this fits with its own commitments to sovereign defence capabilities. Our defence relationship with the United States remains enormously valuable, as does cooperation with European allies. Britain cannot realistically manufacture every component of its military infrastructure, and international partnerships will remain fundamental to our security.

However, those partnerships must allow British forces to maintain essential capabilities when circumstances deteriorate. The Government's Space Strategy sets out ambitious commitments to sovereignty and resilience. Those promises must now be reflected in procurement decisions, cybersecurity requirements, fallback arrangements and the authority our armed forces retain over critical systems. The refrigeration attacks have exposed how much damage poorly secured technology can do.

Ukraine has shown the consequences of restricting access to an essential military service. Britain needs to prepare for both threats. Britain has the opportunity to examine these vulnerabilities now, before a crisis forces us to discover how much control we actually possess. If the Prime Minister is prepared to delay a multibillion-pound defence contract over concerns about British jobs, he should be equally determined to establish whether British personnel will have the control they need when their lives depend upon it. ____________________ Andriy Dovbenko is the founder of UK-Ukraine TechExchange.

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