War with Iran may be delayed, but the threat of renewed conflict remains

Even after the briefing between Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot, neither Israeli intelligence nor the various U.S. intelligence agencies have information indicating that Iran possesses a weapon or any other capability that poses an existential threat to Israel. Nor is there any intelligence indicating that such weapons or capabilities are being actively developed or manufactured. In the past, Iranian officials spoke of their desire to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and change the country's nuclear doctrine to pursue the development of a bomb.

As far as is known, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, who supports this strategy, has already decided in principle to pursue it, but almost nothing has been done in practice. There is also intelligence indicating that Iran has resumed developing and manufacturing ballistic missiles at a rate of several dozen a month, probably fewer than 50, and that it is working to restore and harden nuclear facilities and missile and drone production sites that were put out of commission during Operations Rising Lion and Roaring Lion.

The hardening involves pouring layers of reinforced concrete. Senior figures in the Iranian establishment are also deeply troubled and fear for their survival because of the effective U.S. naval blockade of their ports and the maritime traffic passing through the Strait of Hormuz under U.S. Navy protection, right under their noses and against their wishes. As a result, they have escalated the threats they are issuing through Iranian and international media.

In Israel, the media frequently discuss the possibility of an Iranian "miscalculation" that could lead to an attack on Israel and others in the region. But the real danger at the moment is precisely the opposite: a deliberate Iranian "calculation" in the spirit of the biblical declaration, "Let me die with the Philistines." With each passing day, the possibility grows that Tehran will move from threats to action and attempt to break the blockade and the deadlock in negotiations by attacking the United States, its allies in the Middle East and probably targets beyond the region as well, for example through terrorist attacks on American bases in Europe.

According to reports published in Britain and France, the Iranians are already attempting such attacks. The developments in Iran therefore require Israel's intelligence community and the IDF to closely monitor events there, remain prepared for surprises and exercise caution to avoid provoking the ayatollahs into action before Israel's political system has stabilized and is capable of making informed, considered decisions. The IDF and CENTCOM, the U.S. Central Command, will be fully prepared within a few days, when the third aircraft carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, and the ships of its strike group arrive in the region.

Fear of abandonment But Israel's political and military leadership and intelligence community are primarily concerned about the trends emerging in Washington in recent days. More precisely, they are worried about the apparent intention of President Donald Trump, his vice president and most senior administration officials to bring the Iranian crisis to a close without another military confrontation. Some in Israel and the United States have spoken ironically of "Israel's fear of abandonment."

But an examination of statements made by Trump and his officials over the past week shows that, from Israel's perspective, this anxiety is real and justified. The reason is the dependence Israel has developed on close cooperation with the United States in everything concerning Iran. Certain types of operations are unique to the Israeli Air Force. But it must be acknowledged that without what the IDF calls the American "enablers," Israel would not have achieved what it did in Operations Rising Lion and especially Roaring Lion.

These included the numerous American refueling aircraft that allowed the Israeli Air Force to send "trains" of dozens of planes to bomb Iran in a single mission, as well as U.S. fighter jets that took off from bases in countries across the region and intercepted hundreds of drones and cruise missiles heading from Iran toward Israel's home front. The impressive success of this cooperation has also exposed the limitations of the IDF and Mossad when operating independently in Iran.

Broadly speaking, Operation Rising Lion and earlier operations demonstrated that Mossad and the IDF can successfully carry out impressive, highly targeted operations in Iran without American assistance. These include the "decapitation" of Iran's leadership and the destruction of parts of the infrastructure used to develop and produce nuclear facilities and missiles. But large-scale operations on an "industrial scale," which destroyed and disrupted Iran's financing systems, raw material supply networks and defense development and production facilities for years, became possible only through cooperation between the United States and Israel.

The most worrying possibility is that Israel will be left alone, with limited ability to operate independently in Iran — and that is the best-case scenario. In the worst case, Trump will tie Israel's hands with an unequivocal order not to renew the war, to prevent the United States from being dragged into it. For this reason, Israeli defense leaders have become considerably more concerned this week that the crucial cooperation with the Americans could be sharply reduced or even come to an end.

Trump, as usual, has made contradictory statements. He declared that "the war is effectively over," even as reports emerged that the United States had asked Israel and other countries in the region to be ready for an immediate strike. But in the same statement, Trump made clear that the United States does not intend to abandon its demand that Iran be denied nuclear weapons and that the Strait of Hormuz remain open to international shipping, free of restrictions and transit fees.

The president therefore said that the United States would maintain its highly effective naval blockade of Iranian ports, continue escorting ships carrying oil and gas through the strait and increase the already massive naval force CENTCOM is assembling opposite Iran. Withdrawing the sword would mean abandonment Israel's current political and defense establishment has no problem with the United States negotiating with Iran as long as Washington holds a sharp sword over Tehran's head in the form of a formidable military threat that is ready to be carried out, together with Israel, within hours.

The concern in Jerusalem is that Trump and his administration could very well sign an agreement with the Iranians within days or weeks. Such an agreement would allow the Strait of Hormuz to reopen within a short time and include some Iranian concession on the nuclear issue. For example, Iran might agree to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to resume monitoring the damaged nuclear facilities and the stockpile of highly enriched uranium, which remains buried beneath the rubble.

In return, the United States would agree to at least some of the seven demands on which Iran insists. These include lifting the naval blockade of Iranian ports, removing some sanctions, releasing some of the billions of dollars in Iranian assets frozen in the West and committing, on Israel's behalf as well, not to resume the war. Iran has already received these "sweeteners" once before, in the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran that the U.S. vice president brokered and Trump signed in June of this year.

Fortunately for Israel, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders in the Strait of Hormuz area violated that disgraceful memorandum of understanding, forcing CENTCOM to respond. As a result, the memorandum, which had been a dream come true from Iran's perspective, went up in flames. But the precedent it established remains. Such a bad agreement, from Israel's perspective, would not only grant Iran benefits that would enable it to rebuild and expand its destructive capabilities and those of its proxies to new and dangerous levels.

It would also allow the American president to declare victory and then withdraw the massive U.S. force currently deployed and ready to operate in Iran alongside the IDF. Such American "abandonment" would constitute a stinging defeat for the United States and Israel in the battle for public perception. It would severely erode the deterrence the two countries achieved together through blood and sweat in the operations of 2025 and 2026 and turn Iran into a hegemonic regional power that all the Arab Gulf states would feel compelled to appease.

But the most worrying possibility is that Israel would be left alone, with limited ability to operate independently in Iran. That is the best-case scenario. In the worst case, Trump would tie Israel's hands with an unequivocal order not to renew the war, to prevent the United States from being dragged into it. A discouraging track record Paradoxically, the Iranians themselves are the ones who could prevent this nightmare scenario for Israel from materializing.

That would happen if Tehran decides, as it has threatened, to break the economic stranglehold and diplomatic deadlock by launching a preemptive attack on the United States and its allies. This means the military initiative is currently in Iranian hands. This is also the background to the reports and information emerging about disagreements between Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz on one side and IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir on the other over actions the Iranians might regard as provocations.

Some claim Netanyahu wants to take provocative actions against Iran that would prompt Tehran to respond while U.S. and Israeli forces in the region are at peak readiness and on high alert. Netanyahu and his aides emphatically deny these claims, as does the defense minister. I do not know enough to determine whether these claims are justified. But it is known that the prime minister is currently consulting on security matters almost exclusively with a small group comprising the heads of Mossad and Shin Bet, Israel's domestic security agency, the head of the National Security Council, Israel's ambassador to the United States and the defense minister.

All were appointed by Netanyahu, and all are known for their hawkish views and assertive personalities. It is also important to note in this context that disagreements over such matters are legitimate and are a routine part of discussions between the military and political leadership. Therefore, without delving into what is happening at the political level, it is important to recognize that Chief of Staff Zamir is highly experienced and cautious.

He has already demonstrated his determination to do everything within his authority to ensure that the democratic process is allowed to run its course without interference or disruption arising from security matters. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Israel will not launch an independent offensive operation in Iran in the near future. Instead, it will likely concentrate on an intensive effort to influence the Trump administration not to sign an appeasing memorandum of understanding like the one it signed a few months ago, but rather to maintain pressure and insist on reaching an agreement that is also reasonable from Israel's perspective.

The experience accumulated so far with the current Iranian regime does not inspire optimism in either Washington or Jerusalem. It is therefore highly reasonable to assess that the war with Iran has not ended. It has merely been postponed for a few months, perhaps until the spring or summer of 2027, when the current Iranian regime may be the one to initiate the fighting, having concluded that it must attack to ensure its survival.