The Jerusalem Post, on Iran, 25 October 2026

6.0out of 10Serious

Ex-Mossad chief Barnea intended for Iran to see Israel's operations to overwhelm IRGC

Tap a highlight to see why it matters.2 findings

When the Mossad took the stunning move of publishing multiple videos in real time of its agents in June 2025, one of the main reasons was to overwhelm and confuse the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), former Mossad chief David Barnea has revealed.Leaked on Sunday from comments he made to a closed audience at the Priority Summit this past Thursday.On June 13, 2025, the Mossad released sensational and rare video footage of its co-lead role with the air force in .Three videos showed the Mossad targeting ballistic missile targets, air defense targets, and general preparations for the attacks (with the agents' faces covered up).From the perspective of the videos, it appeared that the Mossad used drones from inside Iran to attack various targets.Iran had previously accused the Mossad of using drones to attack the Karaj facility in June 2021 as well as other operations.Mossad's warehouse of drones used to sabotage IranIt was later confirmed that the Mossad used an entire warehouse of drones to attack and sabotage Iran, along with helping with a large number of , and a significant number of human agents on the ground also assisting in assassinations.Although far more information was quickly publicized about the IDF's actions, these videos gave readers a rare front-row and real-time seat into what normally were entirely clandestine operations which the Mossad would not even admit to.Barnea said at the Priority Summit that the video was deliberately published to trigger mass arrests and make it more difficult for the IRGC to identify actual Israeli agents.“One of the reasons we immediately released an official video on the morning of Operation Rising Lion, with the Mossad logo, was to protect the agents who were there,” Barnea said in a video which Yediot Ahronot shared, and regarding which the Jerusalem Post confirmed the authenticity.

“We wanted to make sure they arrested so many people in Iran that they wouldn't be able to distinguish the wheat from the chaff and would eventually release everyone,” adding that Iran did release all of the detainees.IRGC arrested over 20,000 people on second day of warThe former Mossad chief said that the IRGC arrested 21,000 people on the second day of the fighting.“You have to imagine that when you arrest 21,000 people, even if you've caught an agent or two, eventually you have to release them because everyone's story will be the same: I was walking down the street, I was driving a car, they arrested me,” he said, emphasizing that the IRGC would have no way of knowing who was a real agent with such a vast number of detainees,Barnea added that many of those arrested or executed by the IRGC as “Mossad agents” had nothing to do with the agency.In addition, he said that nearly all of the Mossad agents were never caught, and at the end of the June 2025 operation, he even publicly taunted the IRGC, issuing a statement, “We will [continue to] be there, like we have been there.”His explanation may close the book on the unexplained mystery of why the Mossad would have risked broadcasting some of its agents' actions in real time during the June 2025 operation.In September 2025, the Post reported exclusively that dozens of Mossad women penetrated Iran and were on the ground performing a variety of kinds of operations during Israel's attacks on Tehran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs in June 2025.While the Mossad does not want to bring too much attention to any one sub-group of potential spies, the Post's impression was that the Mossad women of 2025 were doing more of every kind of spy role as compared to their sisters of yesterday.In that same September report, the Post noted that Barnea sent hundreds of Mossad agents, or individuals being run by agents, into operations in Iran simultaneously.

All of the varying groups of staff were highly coordinated.

The spy chief directed a project leading to a diverse spectrum of all of the different kinds of agents and backgrounds of those agents one could imagine.On top of actual Israeli Mossad agents, the spy service has reached new levels in recruiting and training local dissident Iranian agents to act against , the Post reported at the time.While the early 2026 war with Iran is viewed by many as a mixed bag, the June 2025 war was viewed as the most successful Israeli operation of the last three years, along with the exploding beepers used against Hezbollah.

Read the original article on jpost.com (opens in a new tab)
What we found (2)

The Jerusalem Post calls Israel's June 2025 attack on Iran a "preemptive strike" in its own voice, so Israel's justification reaches the reader as fact. It also calls Iran's government "the regime" and "the ayatollahs' regime" in its own narration, and describes what the Mossad hit only as "regime targets".

  1. States one side's claim as fact

    Serious

    “Israel's preemptive strike on Iran's ballistic missiles and air defenses”

    Why this matters
    The Post calls Israel's attack a "preemptive strike" in its own voice, with no attribution.
    The impression it gives
    A reader takes it as settled that Israel struck first only to head off an imminent Iranian attack.
    The context
    "Preemptive" is Israel's justification for the attack, not an established fact. Other coverage of the same remarks describes it plainly as Israel's military campaign against Iranian targets, without adopting Israel's label.

    How we know

    Show it in the article

    Written straight

    On June 13, 2025, Israel attacked Iran's ballistic missiles and air defenses in what Israel called a preemptive strike.

  2. Uses a loaded word

    Minor

    “acting against the regime within Iran”

    Why this matters
    In its first sentence the Post calls Iran's government "the regime" in its own narration.
    The impression it gives
    A reader is told from the start that Iran's government is illegitimate, before any facts are given.
    The context
    This is the Post's own verdict, not a quoted source. Neutral wording such as "Iranian authorities", used in other coverage of the same remarks, was available.

    How we know

    Show it in the article

    “remote-controlled vehicles attacking regime targets”

    Why this matters
    The Post turns the label into a category of target: "regime targets".
    The impression it gives
    A reader takes everything the Mossad hit inside Iran as a legitimate government target.
    The context
    The phrase names no site and no person. It tells the reader nothing about what was actually attacked, only that the Post counts it as "regime".

    How we know

    Show it in the article

    “the ayatollahs' regime”

    Why this matters
    The Post adds "the ayatollahs'" to the label in its own voice.
    The impression it gives
    A reader sees Iran's government as a clerical clique rather than a state.
    The context
    This is the Post's own characterisation, attributed to no one in the article.

    How we know

    • Elsewhere in the article“Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)”

    Show it in the article

How other outlets reported it

Spot something we missed? Report this article

More from The Jerusalem Post

  1. 25 OctIDF chief pushed back on Netanyahu order for ‘action’ against Iran, fearing political motives6.0
  2. 25 OctTrump rules out Sunday strike on Iran as Netanyahu warns Israel faces imminent existential threat3.0
  3. 25 OctIraq braces for renewed Iran conflict after 1,000 strikes on Kurdistan, 600 militia attacks3.0
  4. 25 Oct'Fair game': Iranian officials say US diplomats, officials are targets for assassinations - report3.0
  5. 25 OctTehran threatens strikes on energy, civilian targets, and nuclear escalation if attacked6.0

Everything we scored from The Jerusalem Post