October 7: New details reveal five red-hot Hamas warnings Israel missed

Three years after the Hamas-led October 7 attack on Israel, newly declassified intelligence findings reveal that security officials detected a series of unusual developments in Gaza in the hours before the invasion, including Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif entering an underground emergency shelter, but failed to recognize the signs of an imminent assault. The additional details, cleared for publication by military censors, shed new light on the intelligence failures that preceded the October 7, 2023, attack, when Hamas terrorists breached Israel's border defenses and launched a coordinated assault on communities and military positions in southern Israel.

According to the military investigation, at least five separate warning signs reached the Military Intelligence Directorate and Southern Command during the night of October 6-7. The indicators included the activation of dozens of SIM cards across the Gaza Strip, unusual movements among Hamas rocket units, changes in the deployment of the terrorist group's anti-tank forces, suspicious activity involving senior Hamas officials and movements near one of Deif's bunkers.

The newly released findings establish that Israeli intelligence detected Deif entering an underground tunnel that Hamas had prepared in advance as an emergency shelter. The movement of the Hamas military commander, who was a central figure in planning the attack, was among several unusual developments observed in the hours before the assault. Another detail cleared for publication concerns changes in Hamas' anti-tank deployment, which Israeli intelligence also identified that night.

Taken together, the developments suggested unusual preparations across multiple branches of Hamas' military wing. However, intelligence officials assessed the indicators individually rather than connecting them into a broader picture of an impending attack. Instead of treating the simultaneous developments as evidence of an imminent large-scale operation, officials found explanations for each that appeared to diminish its significance.

The investigation describes the night of October 6-7 as a concentrated example of the flawed assumptions that shaped Israel's intelligence assessments in the period leading up to the attack. Despite receiving warnings from different locations and operational units across Gaza, the military's intelligence apparatus failed to recognize the immediate threat posed by the accumulation of suspicious activity.