Secret Oslo negotiations revealed as Norway releases thousands of previously hidden documents

Norway on Thursday released thousands of pages of documents relating to the secret negotiations that led to the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians, publicizing material that had been kept at the home of key Norwegian negotiators Terje Rod-Larsen and Mona Juul.Among the documents reviewed by The Jerusalem Post are confidential diplomatic correspondence detailing disagreements over Israeli security control, private PLO assessments of Syria's support for Hezbollah and other armed groups, and annotated drafts of the agreement showing provisions that were altered or removed before it was signed.

The documents, published by Norway's National Archives and Foreign Ministry, cover the period from 1983 to 2003.Among the documents are Juul and Rod-Larsen's personal copy of the Oslo Accords, preparatory documents and minutes from the negotiations, strategy papers, correspondence, and records of meetings in Oslo, Copenhagen, and Paris, as well as the signing ceremony in Washington. The collection also includes surveys of living conditions in Gaza and the West Bank.The documents had been kept at the couple's home before being recovered by Norwegian authorities.

Their release follows a police search of the property in February as part of a corruption investigation involving the couple. The investigation is separate from the Oslo archive's historical contents.

The Norwegian Foreign Ministry said the release included material that would not ordinarily be part of a public archive, citing the historical significance of the documents and public interest in examining the negotiations.Oslo memo reveals tensions over security and terrorismAmong the documents is a four-page memo marked “STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL,” sent directly from Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst to Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on July 27, 1993.It records a 45-minute conversation between Holst and senior PLO negotiator Ahmed Qurei, known as Abu Ala, immediately following the 11th round of secret Oslo negotiations.Holst reported that Abu Ala believed that the recent fighting in Lebanon would not derail negotiations and said: “The Syrians sponsor the spoilers of the peace process – Hezbollah and the PFLP-GC.”He also said Syria would not seek an open confrontation with Israel.The remarks provide a contemporaneous account of the PLO negotiator's private assessment of Syria's support for Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), both of which he described as opponents of the peace process.

The memo also details disagreements over security arrangements. According to Holst, Abu Ala said Israel was demanding the right to maintain overall security during the interim period, including after Palestinian self-governance began in Gaza and Jericho.Holst wrote that Abu Ala interpreted this as permitting Israeli forces to retain internal security powers, with Palestinian police subordinate to Israel even in autonomous areas.

The memo records the Palestinian response: “This was not acceptable.”Abu Ala nevertheless accepted that Israel would retain responsibility for external security. The distinction between internal and external security was among the disputes still being negotiated less than seven weeks before the accords were signed.Additionally, Holst wrote that Abu Ala believed that Israeli negotiators were influenced by American interests, particularly concerning UN Security Council Resolution 242 and Jerusalem.Holst clarified that Abu Ala was not suggesting that Israel was seeking American support, but rather believed that the US had its own agenda that remained hostile to the PLO.Abu Ala also suggested that PLO chairman Yasser Arafat could issue a public statement addressing terrorism and the PLO charter before the agreement was signed, provided its wording was agreed upon in advance.Another passage describes Abu Ala's concerns about lawyers' growing involvement in the negotiations.

According to Holst, the Palestinian negotiator said the PLO had brought in legal advisers partly out of concern that Israel's lawyers could outmaneuver their Palestinian counterparts.Abu Ala nevertheless argued that the legal disputes were distracting from the political issues and that implementation would ultimately determine the agreement's significance.“When it is signed, it will be forgotten by everyone,” Abu Ala said, according to Holst's account.

He argued that developments on the ground, rather than the agreement's precise wording, would attract attention.A separate document dated August 16, 1993, titled “Where do we go from here? Some reflections on the Norwegian Channel,” similarly proposed addressing disagreements over terrorism through a joint declaration condemning future acts rather than attempting to settle disputes over past actions.“The issue of terrorism is a case in point.

Definitions differ widely,” the unidentified author wrote.

The paper also warned that mutual mistrust could complicate the final stages of negotiations, noting that “both sides harbor suspicions that the other side hesitates.”Draft agreements show changes to Jerusalem and Palestinian governance provisionAnother document reviewed by the Post is a July 26, 1993 draft of the Oslo Declaration of Principles, marked “final positions,” containing handwritten annotations in English and Arabic, deletions and proposed changes to the agreement that would be signed less than two months later.

The draft explicitly identified Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, and borders as issues Palestinian representatives intended to raise in future negotiations. In the final signed agreement, those subjects were listed as permanent-status issues without distinguishing between the two sides' negotiating positions.

The draft also proposed locating the Palestinian governing council in Jericho, stating, “The seat of the council will be in Jericho.” That provision did not appear in the signed declaration.An annex proposed establishing a Palestinian police force comprised of locally recruited officers and Jordanian nationals recruited abroad and trained as police officers. The text also called for a gradual transfer of responsibility for internal security and public order to Palestinian authorities, alongside the possibility of a temporary international or foreign presence.

The final agreement retained provisions for Palestinian policing, but specified different eligibility requirements for personnel recruited abroad, including Jordanian passport holders and Palestinians with documents issued by Egypt.Another provision in the draft addressed the participation of Palestinians living in Jerusalem in Palestinian elections, subject to arrangements agreed upon by both sides. Similar language was retained in the final agreement.

The document also proposed safe passage for VIPs between Gaza and Jericho, with the term “VIP's” circled by hand. The final agreement broadened the provision to cover people and transportation generally.

The identities of those responsible for the handwritten annotations, and whether individual changes reflected agreed positions or proposals from one side, remain unclear.Norwegian cable details reported Iranian efforts to oppose OsloA separate confidential Norwegian diplomatic cable dated November 21, 1993 describes reported Iranian efforts to organize Palestinian opposition to the Oslo Accords.The Norwegian Embassy in Beirut, then operating from Damascus, reported that Tehran had sought closer cooperation with Palestinian factions, including Hamas and the PFLP-GC.Citing media reports, the cable said Iran had allegedly earmarked $300 million to organize resistance to the peace agreement and instructed its embassy in Damascus to coordinate opposition activities.

The cable also described efforts by Palestinian opposition factions to undermine the agreement. According to the embassy, Hamas sought to establish an alternative to the PLO, while several other groups called for continued opposition to the accords and the restructuring of the Palestinian national movement.

The document also described meetings involving Palestinian opposition groups, Hezbollah representatives and Iranian Revolutionary Guards commander Mohsen Rezaei.However, an embassy source who attended a meeting with Rezaei said they did not discuss practical cooperation or financial assistance.

The cable did not independently establish that the reported $300 million had been provided or that Tehran's alleged instructions had been carried out.

The Norwegian Foreign Ministry said it had not distinguished between material considered to have archival value and material that did not, or between documents belonging in ministry archives, third-party material, and private records. It said the aim was to make available as much material as possible that could shed light on the historical Oslo process and ensure transparency.