Hamas seeks to rebuild as Israel navigates between Trump and Likud voters
On Tuesday morning this week, I stood on Ali Muntar Hill, on the outskirts of Gaza City's Shuja'iyya neighborhood, and recalled the first time I climbed it many years ago. It was shortly after the Six-Day War, in July 1967. From the hill, barely two refugee camps could be seen: Jabaliya and Shuja'iyya. Most of the area around the hill, which rises 90 meters above sea level, was covered with citrus groves, cultivated fields and sand. To the east, I could see Nahal Oz and Kfar Aza. The small town of Sderot was not yet visible from there. Today, the view is completely different. The Palestinian side is now a sea of ruins: slabs of concrete, roofs lying almost flush with the ground, skeletal steel bars jutting upward and gray as the dominant color. On the Israeli side, the orchards and fields of Nahal Oz are green. Tractors and other agricultural machinery work almost to the final furrow, very close to the security fence, which in some places now rises more than 10 meters. Some biblical commentators identify Ali Muntar Hill with the "Gates of Gaza" — the place associated with the biblical Samson and the Philistines. An 18th-century European traveler who drew a map of Gaza marked Ali Muntar as "Mount Samson." The term "Gates of Gaza" aptly describes what I saw while standing on the earthen berm surrounding the large IDF outpost recently established atop the strategic hill. It is a large square compound capable of housing a company-sized force or more, the latest word in military outpost architecture in Gaza. It has tanks, mortars, observation posts and an array of optical, electro-optical and radar technology designed to prevent a surprise attack on the outpost and allow its troops to dominate the surrounding area through observation, intelligence sensors and firepower, up to the Yellow Line and beyond it. The yellow concrete barriers marking the Yellow Line, the official boundary of IDF control inside Gaza, are barely visible amid the ruins of Shuja'iyya. The outpost lies several hundred meters east of the Yellow Line so that Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists cannot charge it directly from territory still under their control. They would have to cross hundreds of meters of killing ground before reaching it. A few kilometers to the north and south, one can see earthen berms topped with modular walls made of iron frames filled with sand, surrounding neighboring outposts built according to the same design. Forty-two such outposts currently encircle the territory controlled by Hamas. According to Southern Command figures, the IDF now controls 64% of the Gaza Strip, while Hamas controls 36%. In October 2025, when the ceasefire under which the remaining hostages were released was reached, the division of territory between the IDF and Hamas agreed upon by the mediators was roughly 50-50. But in the nearly year since then, the IDF has moved the Yellow Line westward and northward. It is a highly effective pressure lever that has caused Hamas to show greater flexibility in negotiations with senior members of the Board of Peace. We walk along the upper section of the outpost wall, see a group of soldiers below staring at screens and hear brief exchanges over the radio. Suddenly, a small drone rises from among them and flies toward what was once the Shuja'iyya neighborhood. The officer commanding the drone team explains: "We received an indication that there are probably terrorists observing us or planning to plant an explosive device. We're trying to locate them without their noticing us. This drone can get there quietly, without being detected." He shows me a person moving inside a ruined building on the screen. "He may be one of the group, but right now he isn't armed, so at this stage we aren't required to act against him or against others who may be hiding in that building." "How would you act?" I ask. The officer points to an array of drones of different sizes and configurations that can not only observe and film what is happening inside the Gaza neighborhood but also carry out surprise attacks. Contrary to what is sometimes reported in the media, troops in Gaza face no restrictions if they identify something or someone in the immediate vicinity of the Yellow Line or near the outpost who could pose an immediate threat. "They say you're frustrated because you need the chief of staff's approval to fire at armed terrorists who provoke you. Is that true?" I asked one of the soldiers. "I'm not familiar with anything like that," says the soldier, a conscript serving in the regular Paratroopers Brigade. "I have no such restriction, and the rules of engagement against anyone threatening us are the same as they were when we arrived here." The gap between media reports and what happens on the ground stems from the rules governing targeted killings deep inside Gaza, which do indeed require the chief of staff's approval and sometimes that of the political echelon as well. On the same day this week that I toured the Gaza outposts, such a targeted strike was carried out in the evening, killing two senior Hamas commanders and several company-level commanders as they sat in a cafe planning what the IDF spokesperson described as a "terror attack plot." Palestinians reported that six civilians were also killed in the strike, which was apparently carried out by a drone after precise intelligence identification by the Shin Bet. There was a certain slowdown in the pace of targeted killings two weeks ago following a request from Washington, but this week the pace accelerated again, reaching a peak in recent days. Most are carried out using attack drones and unmanned aerial vehicles. According to IDF figures, since the ceasefire took effect on Oct. 10 last year, about 730 terrorists have been attacked. Of these, 520 were confirmed killed, including around 80 members of Hamas' Nukhba force who took part in the October 7 massacre and were identified by a dedicated Shin Bet command center, two heads of Hamas' military wing and around 125 senior or mid-level commanders. On Tuesday alone, another six Hamas commanders and one Islamic Jihad commander were added to the list. The Paratroopers Brigade force I joined killed a Nukhba operative and another Hamas commander on Wednesday and destroyed a tunnel in the Shuja'iyya area along the way. The American green light for an accelerated pace of targeted killings in Gaza, as well as for aggressive action in Syria, indicates that Trump understands Netanyahu and his government's need to project a tough security posture ahead of the elections in an effort to appeal to right-wing voters. Kung Fu Panda in Gaza A senior commander in the area, whom I accompanied, takes me to the foot of the outpost and leads me through a narrow door into a tunnel dug beneath the ridge on which Ali Muntar Hill sits. The tunnel was discovered after the ceasefire as part of a highly ambitious IDF effort to locate and disable all offensive and combat tunnels. As part of that effort, closely spaced drilling was carried out over dozens of kilometers, with impressive results. The drilling and advanced technological sensors used by the IDF exposed underground networks on a vast scale. Military Intelligence had estimated that Hamas and other Palestinian organizations had dug hundreds of kilometers of tunnels beneath Gaza, but their locations were unknown. Southern Command said Thursday that "about 85% of the underground infrastructure in areas inside the Yellow Line has been destroyed or neutralized." According to the IDF, that amounts to more than 260 kilometers of tunnels. Southern Command officials say with confidence that there are no longer tunnels in IDF-controlled territory that are unknown or have not been exposed. Their destruction will soon be completed, either by detonation or by pumping concrete into them. On Wednesday alone, troops from the elite Yahalom engineering unit sealed two kilometers of tunnels in the central Gaza camps area, still under Hamas control, and in southern Gaza. The reason the IDF does not blow up all the tunnels is that flooding them makes it possible to seal and disable tunnels currently located under Hamas-controlled territory as well and to identify the precise locations of the shafts leading into them. Flooding the tunnels, for example, revealed that some begin and end at the Indonesian Hospital, visible from the Ali Muntar outpost. The hospital is still standing, though it is not operating. Together with the engineering officer of Division 99, Lt. Col. M., I descend into the tunnel, which begins in the Shuja'iyya neighborhood to the west and branches into command rooms, living quarters and combat shafts near the Israeli border. This tunnel was not designed to cross into Israeli territory like nearby attack tunnels. Rather, it formed part of a network of underground infrastructure and Gazan homes prepared as defensive and combat infrastructure for the Gaza Strip. Hamas knew Israel would invade Gaza after October 7, perhaps even before then, and prepared the entire Strip, particularly the built-up areas near the border, as defensive compounds above and below ground. The organization scattered thousands of cameras at various heights in homes to determine precisely where IDF troops were moving, then planned to ambush them underground, emerge from a nearby shaft — itself located in a civilian home — attack them and escape back underground. There were thousands of booby-trapped homes, some of which exploded on our troops, as well as homes from which terrorists in the tunnels received water and electricity. "That's why we had to destroy 70% of the Strip," a senior commander in the sector tells me. "If we hadn't done so, our casualties would have been on an unbearable scale." Much of the enormous destruction visible from Ali Muntar Hill was caused using what the IDF now calls "Kung Fu Panda." These are old Zelda armored personnel carriers loaded with hundreds of kilograms of explosives, fitted with remote-control systems and sent into the heart of areas beneath which Hamas had dug tunnels and prepared for combat, after residents had been ordered to evacuate. The explosions severed electrical wires and cables carrying information to Hamas' command-and-control centers in the tunnels, preventing the organization from fighting as it had planned. But the IDF finds it difficult to explain these basic facts to international public opinion. The destruction, which Israel says is the result of Hamas' use of the population as human shields, is widely perceived as revenge for the atrocities of October 7, particularly because of statements by government ministers, foremost among them Itamar Ben-Gvir, Bezalel Smotrich and Defense Minister Israel Katz. As I look out at the devastation, I notice several shells of buildings inside Shuja'iyya that have not been completely destroyed and show signs of life. It turns out these are homes belonging to armed clans opposed to Hamas that, according to reports in Arab and Western media, receive weapons and assistance from the IDF and Shin Bet. The homes of the Helles and Jundiya clans are inside the Yellow Line but also within the outpost's field of fire, and they bear clear markings so the IDF will not strike them from the air or ground. The two clans are organized under what is known as the "Shuja'iyya Popular Defense Forces," which Hamas views as a bitter enemy and a threat to its rule in Gaza. It therefore fights them continuously, with clashes sometimes ending in defeat for the armed militias and at other times forcing Hamas itself to retreat. Such an incident occurred at the beginning of the week and was mistakenly described in Israeli media as an explosive device and gunfire targeting IDF troops, with no casualties. In fact, it was a battle between one of the clans and Hamas, which ambushed and attacked its members. From the Israeli outpost, it initially looked like gunfire directed at our forces, but the IDF quickly understood what was happening and acted accordingly. In general, a substantial portion of Hamas' current military activity