How to begin the Gaza endgame

It has been a year since the ceasefire in Gaza. Of course, the actual cessation of hostilities was never intended to be the end but rather the beginning of a process – colloquially known as the “20 Points” – that would involve the disarmament of Hamas, the withdrawal of the IDF, the reconstruction of Gaza, and the resumption of peace talks between Israel and a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority. Few expected these goals to be achieved.

A year later, none has been. Hamas clearly isn’t “disarming.” Instead, it has killed hundreds of people in a successful attempt to secure its unchallenged rule in the parts of Gaza not controlled by the IDF and reassert its control of trade and aid shipments. Israel clearly is not withdrawing. Instead, it has expanded its zone of control far beyond what was envisioned in the ceasefire agreement and is building military installations that suggest preparations for a long stay.

The Palestinian Authority is clearly not “revitalizing.” Instead, the PA continues to be the fundamentally unserious institution it has been since its creation over 30 years ago. You know, the organization that turned down without explanation multiple peace offers, stole everything that was not nailed down, initiated and then proceeded to lose an absurd war that targeted Israel’s civilian population, fecklessly lost control of Gaza – and then blamed all its failings on an “occupation” that, by any known definition of the term, had ended as a result of the Oslo Accords that created the PA in the first place.

The plan also assumed that the bill for Gaza’s reconstruction – an estimated $70 billion assuming the money is spent efficiently – would be covered by Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. That is highly unlikely. Even in the best of times, $70 billion would be a substantial burden. And these are hardly the best of times. The Gulf states face enormous economic losses from the wars with Iran and the Houthis, compounded by vast expenditures on projects such as Saudi Arabia’s NEOM city.

Their priority now will be defense spending, not rebuilding Gaza. Some funding may materialize, but nowhere near $70 billion. The bottom line: the 20-point plan is moribund, and Gaza’s reconstruction has yet to get underway. So what now? The default option is to “freeze” the conflict and accept the current status quo. Hamas would (mis)rule a much-diminished Gaza whose residents would spend most of their lives standing in long lines for aid supplies.

Israel would spend a fortune maintaining tens of thousands of troops in Gaza indefinitely into the future. And the PA would continue to do the only thing it seems able to do – act as an impediment to the creation of a Palestinian state at peace with Israel. Sooner or later, this frozen conflict would thaw into another round of horrific violence. We can do better. The starting point is to recognize that the eliminating Hamas’s surviving military forces and political cadres is a prerequisite for reconstruction.

No donor – let alone an investor – will be commit to pay billions of dollars to rebuild things that are likely to be destroyed in the next military confrontation between Israel and Hamas – a confrontation that would be inevitable if Hamas survives. But how to get it done? The International Security Force (ISF) that is supposed to police Gaza is not designed to fight Hamas forces. As for the feeble Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) – they cannot possibly tackle Hamas.

Every military confrontation between the two forces has ended in a PASF defeat, and it is likely that any PA institutions established in Gaza would be subverted by Hamas and eventually come under its de facto control. There are three possible approaches to eliminating Hamas. One is for Israel to invade the portion of Gaza under Hamas control and root the enemy out. This approach, however, would entangle the IDF in vicious combat in areas crowded with civilians.

There would be thousands of Israeli and Palestinian civilian casualties. It’s not a good idea. A second approach is to cut off all aid to the Strip and simply starve Hamas into submission. That, of course, leaves two million Gazan civilians starving as well. This too is not a good idea. The third approach is to transfer the Strip’s civilians from the area under Hamas control and resettle them safely and humanely on Israel’s side of the Yellow Line.

This is a good idea. Once Gaza’s civilians had been relocated to areas under Israeli control, Hamas’s military position would become untenable. The enemy would have been stripped of its human shields, as well as its access to the aid supplies it depends on to keep its forces supplied. At that point, either of the first two options shifts from being a bad idea to being a very good one. The Americans understand how necessary this is, and it was not surprising that CENTCOM’s Civil-Military Coordination Center started drawing up plans to build high-quality temporary housing for Gazans in the part of the Strip held by Israel almost immediately after it was set up.

Actual implementation, however, has been delayed due to two challenges. Both can be overcome. The first is that there is almost no money to work with. So where could the funding come from? Under the Oslo Accords, Israel collects VAT and other taxes paid by Palestinians, and transfers those funds to the PA. For years now, Israel has justifiably withheld funds due to the PA’s support of terrorism. So far, $5 billion has been withheld. Why not spend those funds – as well as future Palestinian tax revenue owed to the PA – directly on Gaza’s reconstruction?

This would bring *significant benefits* to the Palestinians who need help the most. And at the same time, it would enhance rather than degrade Israel’s security. The second challenge is a shortage of workers. The portion of Gaza controlled by Israel has very few residents available for employment. To address that, three thousand Gazan construction workers – all vetted by the Israel Security Agency (aka Shin Bet) – were invited last month to cross the Yellow Line and get started on an initial project in Rafah.

They were, however, stopped by Hamas forces – at gunpoint – from showing up at the construction site. That should surprise no one. Hamas has also done the math and knows that its survival depends on maintaining its control of Gaza’s civilian population at all costs. So where can we find the required workers? A hundred-thousand Palestinians from the West Bank used to be employed in Israel but lost their work permits after October 7. Many of them are construction workers.

Why not hire them to start the Gaza reconstruction? Doing so would bring immediate economic relief to impoverished West Bank Palestinians, and again, would benefit rather than endanger Israel’s security. Once temporary resettlement got going, it could easily take a year or more before the lion’s share of Gaza’s population is under Israel’s control. After that, however, the stage would be set for the final defeat of Hamas. And once that is done, the path would be open to the building of a better Gaza – a peaceful and prosperous Gaza thriving alongside Israel.